tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26497833623119889482024-03-13T17:51:45.647+00:00NOTA BENE legal consultingThis blog was launched by Nicholas Bevan in April 2013 to alert his fellow legal professionals to the systemic illegality that permeated the UK's national law provision for compulsory third party motor insurance. Major reforms have resulted. Unfortunately, Brexit has stalled this process, making this blog largely redundant. Earlier posts are retained here as archive material. See also www.nicholasbevan.com
Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.comBlogger197125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-45985514974361490422020-03-01T17:31:00.003+00:002020-08-18T14:08:06.407+01:00DRAWING A LINE<br />
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This post marks an end of an important chapter in my life.</div>
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Between 2012 and 2019 I pursued a law reform campaign that
successfully removed many unjust exclusions and restrictions of motor insurer liability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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It is highly regrettable that successive UK governments
have been either brow beaten or outwitted by the powerful motor insurance
lobby into denying members of the public their proper legal entitlement to adequate compensation. The fact that I, as a private citizen of limited means, was able
to force the government to introduce these long overdue reforms is a testament
to the force and efficacy of European Law. None of this would have been
possible otherwise.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The European Union,
for all its faults, not only espouses the principle of equality under the law
but it enforces it.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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Further important reform in this area is highly unlikely due to
Brexit. The public are now at the mercy of an indifferent executive and a civil justice system that has rarely been as inaccessible to and institutionally biased against ordinary private citizens, as now.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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I list below <b>19 </b>of these <b>reforms</b>, each one secured in the face of the motor insurance industry's trenchant opposition, as a
testament to what has been lost in Brexit. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<h2>
July 2015<o:p></o:p></h2>
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The Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) was <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">stripped of many of its arbitrary powers</b> to reject genuine claims under
the Uninsured Drivers Agreement (UDA) 1999<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
in July 2015<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> when
the new UDA 2015 was published. <o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
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These provisions had been extensively criticised by me<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
as either oppressive, unnecessary or illegal<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Their removal was the result of several
years of campaigning.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">The Reforms <o:p></o:p></b></div>
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The UDA 2015 addresses many deficiencies in the predecessor
scheme, all of which I had exposed and criticised in my published articles,
lectures and detailed consultation response<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
to the Department for Transport<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>:<o:p></o:p></div>
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1. It uses <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">clearer language </b>and is<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> half
the length</b> of its predecessor<o:p></o:p></div>
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2. The new UDA removes<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> several oppressive conditions precedent to
liability and strike-out clauses</b> that present a veritable minefield to the
inexperienced practitioner’ and most particularly to lay applicants’ under the
UDA 1999<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These enable the MIB to dismiss genuine
claims for the trivial infractions of procedural rules that were unnecessary
and which conferred the MIB with additional powers and discretions beyond
anything conferred on ordinary individuals under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)
governing civil claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is particularly
inappropriate for a compensatory scheme where the government encourages lay
claimants to present their applications to the MIB direct<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
without independent legal representation:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 8<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[9]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>:</b>
required all notices and documentation to be supplied to the MIB by fax, after this
technology has long since become obsolete, or by registered or recorded
delivery post (when many rural post offices have been closed), set as a
condition precedent of any liability, when the CPR stipulated ordinary post;<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 9
(1):</b> required notice within 14 days of commencement of proceedings against
the uninsured defendant.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>One problem
with this is its fatal similarity to the wording of the standard notice
requirement for insured claims set by s152(1) Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA) set a
precondition to an insurers’ statutory liability under s151(5) RTA (‘before or
within 7 days after the bringing of the proceedings’) which I have first-hand
knowledge of from defending MIB claims for Direct Line and AXA prior to 1999
(where a similar provision was introduced to the UDA 1988 which then applied)
that many inexperienced practitioners regularly confuse and which the MIB invoke
to reject claims;<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 108pt; mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 9
(2):</b> required such notice to be sent by fax or recorded delivery or
registered post (clause 8) accompanied by an excessively extensive dossier comprising
no less than seven different categories of supporting documentation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This went far beyond any disclosure
prescribed by the Pre-action Protocol or under the CPR and which included
documents not necessarily relevant to the claim, such as with Clause 9.2(c) that
included household or life insurance policies; along with the requirement for a
sealed copy of the claim form or writ to be supplied (at a time when the courts
were taking weeks to process new claims);<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clauses
10 to 12</b>: required claimants to notify it of any significant development in
the action, including the service of an amended pleadings within seven days of
such a development occurring set as an absolute precondition of any liability
and unqualified by reasonableness.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This
is unnecessary as it has been long established the MIB is entitled to be joined
as a party to a claim against an uninsured driver, because it is an interested
party with an ultimate liability to compensate<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>;
<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 13</b>:
a condition precedent that required all claimants to produce evidence that they
had reported to the police the defendant’s failure to provide insurance
details, contrary to s154 RTA, within a reasonable time of the incident.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>No definition of what was meant by reasonable
is offered.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This subverts the statutory
aim which is to bolster, not hinder, the prospects of a claimant recovering
compensation.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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3. The new UDA also <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">removes various unlawful exclusions</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">of liability</b> that are to be found in
the UDA 1999:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause
6.1(c)</b>: exclusion of subrogated claims (such as by credit hire companies
and employers’ sick payments) in circumstances where such claims are recoverable
in a normal civil action<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause
6.(e)</b>: exclusion of claims by passengers with actual or constructive knowledge
that the vehicle is being used in furtherance of a crime (any offence, however
trivial) or constructive knowledge that it is uninsured<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
etc;<o:p></o:p></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 17</b>:
which purported to entitle the MIB to deduct any compensation received from
other sources.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The MIB has exploited
this to deduct gratuitous payments by employers or relatives as well as life
policies<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
in circumstances where such sums would be ignored under a normal assessment of
damages.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h2>
Autumn 2016 / Early 2017<o:p></o:p></h2>
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When the Secretary of State for Transport refused to remove
two illegal clauses<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
from the UDA 2015 or to undertake a wide-ranging review of the sufficiency of
the UK’s transposition of the Directive (previously requested by myself and several
other respondents in 2013), I recruited RoadPeace to support a judicial review (JR)
of the minister’s conduct and introduced them to Leigh Day solicitors.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p><br />
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
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The judicial review<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
challenged the non-conformity of the RTA, The Rights Against Insurers
Regulations 2002 and both MIB Agreements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>It also disputed the line taken by the Court of Appeal in two rulings<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
where it concluded that member states enjoy a legislative discretion to permit
insurers to invoke contractual restrictions in cover and breaches of policy by
their insured against a third-party victim<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h2>
December 2016 <o:p></o:p></h2>
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The defendant’s first concession to the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">RoadPeace</i> JR was to issue a consultation paper<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
on reforming the scope of compulsory third party motor insurance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">admitted
</b>that the<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> exclusion of incidents on
private property </b>and<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> the definition
of ‘motor vehicles’ </b>within the RTA<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> do
not</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">conform</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">with the wider scope required by the Directive</b>. <o:p></o:p></div>
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This made it a easier to bring a public law action against
the state for damages under the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Francovich<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[19]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></i>
principle.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h2>
10 January 2017<o:p></o:p></h2>
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The government made further concessions, again directly in
response to the grounds of complaint raised within the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">RoadPeace</i> judicial review, by<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">
announcing (</b>shortly before the hearing) several<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> reforms</b> <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">to the MIB
agreements</b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These took effect from 1
March 2017:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Uninsured Drivers Scheme<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1. <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">The UDA 2015</b> was<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> amended<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[20]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></b>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">to remove the two unlawful exclusions</b>
of liability, complained of in July 2015: one that purported to exclude any liability
for uninsured property damage (clause7 UDA 2015); the other purported to exclude
any claim by a victim of a terrorist incident (clause 9 UDA 2015)<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[21]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">Untraced Drivers Scheme<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The DfT also published a <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">new Untraced Drivers Agreement (UtDA) 2017<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[22]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></b>
to address the shortcomings and injustices in the UtDA 2003<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[23]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
that had been pleaded in the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">RoadPeace</i>
JR instigated in October 2015 (many of which had also been raised two and a
half years before in my consultation response of April 2013):<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
2. These changes <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">included
the omission from the new scheme of the following</b> provisions contained in
the UtDA 2003:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause
4(3):</b> that imposed a strict requirement, set as a condition precedent of
any liability, that the incident be reported to the police within 5 days (for
property damage) or 14 days (injury) on penalty of the entire claim being
rejected<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[24]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ellitts
& Wilson & MIB</i> [2015] EWCA (unreported, 11 May 2015) Blair J upheld
a rejection of a claim based on this clause being invoked against a ten-year-old
passenger where his mother reasonably (but erroneously) believed that the
responsible driver had correctly identified himself and provided his full
insurance details;<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 5</b>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">(1) (g) </b>in so far as it purported to
exclude any liability for subrogated claims; <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause
5(1) (f)</b> for passenger knowledge that the vehicle was being used in
furtherance of a crime or used to avoid or escape arrest<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[25]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>;
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 9</b>
that excluded any entitlement to interest until one month after receipt of a
police report of the incident, in circumstances where police records, let alone
reports, are not routinely made in many police authorities;<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 6</b>,
that purports to exclude subrogated claims. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See above under the July 2015 reforms to the
UDA.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
3.<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> Other improvements</b>
either promised within the JR or <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">incorporated
into the UtDA 2017</b>:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 71.7pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -17.85pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->Improved provision to protect children and
mentally incapacitated claimants by requiring all such settlements to be
approved by an independent arbitrator (<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause14</b>);<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 71.7pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -17.85pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->Improved levels of recoverable legal costs in
serious injury claims (<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 21</b>);<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->A clearer statement that the formerly unlawful
strict 3-year limitation period for bringing a claim was substituted by the
normal limitation periods under the Limitation Act 1980 (<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 3</b>);<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->The misleading terminology employed within the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">UDA 2015 (clause 8 (1) & (3))</b> and <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">UtDA 2017 (Clauses 8(1) & (3)</b> by
the phrase ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">knew or had reason to believe
that</i>’ to be explained as requiring actual knowledge as stipulated by the
Directive for the single permitted exclusion, this to be clarified by the MIB
by amending its notes for guidance<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[26]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>;<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]-->The unclear provision concerning the MIB’s right
to deduct certain sums, within both the <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">UDA
2015 </b>and<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> UtDA 2017</b>, to be
clarified within the MIB’s notes for guidance<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[27]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
as being without prejudice to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Parry v
Cleaver</i>. [1970] AC 1, [1969] 2 WLR 821.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 54pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
4. The DfT also agreed within the JR to publish further guidance
on the correct state of mind to trigger the statutory exclusion of insurer
liability for guilty passenger knowledge <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">s151(4)
RTA<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[28]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a></b>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The words ‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">knew or had reason to believe’</i> are required to signify actual
knowledge as opposed to constructive knowledge. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h2>
3 March 2017<o:p></o:p></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I was the first to identify a serious problem with <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Clause 10 </b>of the 10 January version <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">of the UtDA 2017</b>. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> </b>stipulated
that the claimant (and no other person) must complete and submit the claim form
(when the claim form itself contains a disclosure mandate that, is so excessive
in its extent and beyond anything that would be permitted in a civil action
under the Civil Procedure Rules and which arguably constituted a breach of the
HRC right to privacy).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This provision was
accompanied by a requirement that only the claimant in person should respond to
the MIB’s requests for information or provide statements.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">This
requirement had the effect of preventing claimants from benefiting from
independent legal representation</b>. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
These requirements were imposed as a condition precedent to
any liability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It made no allowances for
children, handicapped individuals or claimants who cannot read or speak
English.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In early February I approached MASS, APIL and the Law
Society as well as a number of leading law firms<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn29;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[29]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
and briefed them on how this infringed the HRC Art 6 right to a fair trial as
well as the time-honoured British right to independent legal representation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They supported me. The New Law Journal published
my opinion piece<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn30;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[30]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This highlighted this unconstitutional
restriction as an example of the sort of problem that results where an agency of
a powerful industry (which is itself a consortium owned and operated by that
industry) enjoys such extensive political leverage and lack of proper scrutiny that
it can influence a minister, in private, to approve provisions that undermine
the fairness of the scheme that he is responsible for regulating.<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn31;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[31]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This flash campaign resulted in the 10 January version of
the UtDA 2017 being hurriedly <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">substituted
within a week of it coming into force</b> by a revised verstion, backdated to
28 February 2017. This <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">omitted the
offending provision<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn32;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[32]</span></b></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
</b>thus<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> </b>entitling all claimants to
be represented.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h2>
7 November 2017<o:p></o:p></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On 7 November Mr Justice Ouseley handed down his judgment in
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">RoadPeace v Secretary of State for
Transport </i>[2017] EWHC 2725 (Admin)<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn33;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[33]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The judgment <b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">identifies
the following infringements</b> of the Directive:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo4; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Sections
145 and 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988</b> wrongly restrict mandatory
third-party motor cover to vehicle use in public spaces<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo4; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Sections
145 and 182 of the Road Traffic Act 1988</b> wrongly restrict the types of
vehicles subject to the compulsory insurance to road vehicles<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo4; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Section
152(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988</b> wrongly permits an insurer to invoke a
misrepresentation or non-disclosure to avoid its statutory liability to
compensate a third party<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="margin-left: 72pt; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo4; text-indent: -18pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: symbol; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7pt "times new roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Regulation
2 of the Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002</b> wrongly limits the direct
right of action against motor insurers to UK accidents<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Unfortunately, the learned judge declined to provide a <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Marleasing</i> style purposive interpretation
of these provisions to cure them of their non-conformity with EU law.<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
But for the timely coincidence of the European Court of
Justices (ECJ)’s ruling in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Farrell v
Whitty 2</i> [2017] Case (C<span face="" style="font-family: "cambria math", serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "Cambria Math";">‑</span>413/15)<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn34;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[34]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
on 10 October 2017 accident victims would still have found it very difficult,
if not impossible, to invoke their rights in these circumstances, as it the
government shows little sign of taking any steps to remedy these infringements,
particularly in the wake of Brexit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Fortunately, this ruling now makes it highly probable that the provisions
of the Motor Insurance Directives can be relied on in an ordinary personal
injury action against the MIB (as though enacted word-for-word within UK
legislation) because of the MIB’s close association with the state on <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Foster v British Gas</i> principles of
direct effect<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn35;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[35]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>. <o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In the circumstances, these specific findings in the JR have
an immediate and direct legal effect, even if the government has no intention
of introducing any statutory reform in view of Brexit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Accordingly, victims injured by motor vehicles on private property
or by unusual off-road vehicles that are not subject to compulsory insurance
under the RTA or victims of mechanical defects not attributable to the
vehicles’ user or owner - can now recover their civil law entitlement to
damages directly from the MIB<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn36;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">[36]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>,
in place of the absent insurer, without having to pursue a risky, expensive and
lengthy public law action against the state.<o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">The first two JR findings
of non-conformity also impact on both MIB schemes</b>, because they each purport
to restrict their scope to events that are subject to compulsory third-party
cover as prescribed by the RTA.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
corollary of these JR findings is that the scope of both MIB schemes is also
extended in parallel by the EU law direct effect principle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p><br />
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Accordingly, the MIB is liable to meet claims where the
vehicle responsible is insured but the policy is restricted to liabilities
occurring on roads or other public places.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h2>
July 2019<o:p></o:p></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I was the first and possibly the only legal commentator to
spot the glaring flaw in the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the governments flagship
legislation, the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 that was intended to ensure that victims of accidents caused by automated vehicles would be guaranteed no fault
liability compensation. This concept was predicated on their being a valid and
enforceable policy of motor insurance in place. In my two-part serialised
feature <i>Driverless Vehicles: a future perfect?</i> I warned that motor insurers most
common defence ploy was to apply, after the incident giving rise to a claim, for
an order under s152 Road Traffic Act 1988 that the policy was void ab initio due
to a misrepresentation by a policyholder. I demonstrated, as early as 2013,
that this was unlawful as it breached EC Directive 2004/103. In June 2019 ex
post facto declarations under section 152(2) Road Traffic Act 1988 were effectively
abolished under Regulation 6 of The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance)
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019, unless unequivocally invoked prior
the incident giving rise to the claim. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Also in June, the Court of Appeal delivered a landmark
ruling in which it gave judgment against the Motor Insurers Bureau in <i>MIB v
Lewis</i> [2019] EWCA Civ 909 in a complicated comparative law case based on the
MIB’s surrogate liability for the state, due to its close working relationship with
the Department for Transport.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The court
applied precisely the same ratio and case authorities outlined, for the first
time by me, in my independent research: published in my 2016 doctoral paper as
well as in my New LW Journal Articles dating back to 2015 and in particular, in
‘<i>Putting wrongs to rights</i>’, Parts 1 & 2, in May and June 2016. <o:p></o:p><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10pt;">
In practical
terms, this ruling fixes the MIB<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>with an
entirely new category of liability, independently of those under (i) its
contractual obligations with the Secretary of State for Transport, currently
set out in the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 (UDA) and the Untraced Drivers
Agreement 2017 (UtDA) and (ii) its statutory obligations under the Motor
Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body)
Regulations 2003.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 10pt;">
This new
liability is based on directly applicable European law, which will survive as
retained EU law unless and until this outcome is reversed by the Secretary of
State for Transport after the Brexit implementation period.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;">Under this new law the MIB is obliged to
compensate motor accident victims who have been wrongly denied a compensatory
guarantee through compulsory insurance due to the government’s failure to
implement fully Article 3 of the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103 (the
Directive) within the provisions of Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (the
1988 Act) and the EC Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002.</span>
<br />
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;">
<!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><br clear="all" />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<br />
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[1]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166947/1999-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166947/1999-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[2]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166917/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166917/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-wales.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[3]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See (MIB Reform) Part II: Why the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 1999 Needs to be
Scrapped, JPIL 2011 issue 2; On the right road? Parts 1-4, February 2013;
Consultation Response by Nicholas Bevan, 22 April 2013, to the DfT Consultation
on the MIB Agreements, an infringement complaint to the European Commission in
October 2013 and in a detailed paper prepared at the Law Commission’s behest in
December 2013 with further ad hoc articles and case commentaries that feature
these failings<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[4]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> On
the basis that they breached the EU law prohibition of exclusions and
restrictions of liability, save where expressly permitted within the Motor
Insurance Directives<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[5]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> My
full consultation response is available online at: <a href="http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/the-full-monty.html">http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/the-full-monty.html</a>
<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[6]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
The DfT Consultation on the MIB Agreements, in 2013<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[7]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Which remains in force for accidents predating 1 August 2015 despite my seeking
for the changes to be given retrospective effect<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn8" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[8]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/compensation-victim-uninsured-driver">https://www.gov.uk/compensation-victim-uninsured-driver</a><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn9" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[9]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
All these clauses refer to the UDA 1999 and are excised from the new UDA<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn10" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[10]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Gurtner v Circuit</i> 1968 QB 587<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn11" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[11]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
In contravention of the equivalence principle in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Evans V SST</i> [2003] (Case C 63/01)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn12" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[12]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> In
contravention of the equivalence principle in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Evans V SST</i> [2003] (Case C 63/01)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn13" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[13]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> In
contravention of the equivalence principle in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Evans V SST</i> [2003] (Case C 63/01) and held to be unlawful in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Delaney v SST</i> [2015] EWCA Civ 172<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn14" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[14]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See the entry below under January 2017 where these provisions are removed from
both schemes with effect from 1 March<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn15" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[15]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Issued in October 2015 and whose first instance finding is reported in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">RoadPeace v SST and MIB</i> [2017] EWCH 2725
(Admin)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn16" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[16]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">EUI v Bristol Alliance Limited Partnership</i>
[2017] EWCA Civ 1267 and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Sahin v Havard</i>
[2016] EWCA 1202<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn17" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[17]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Whereas in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ruiz Bernaldez</i> [1996] Case
C-129/94 the ECJ decreed:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
‘<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Article 3(1) of
the First Directive [</i>which first imposed the motor insurance requirement<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">] precludes a company insuring against civil
liability in respect of the use motor vehicles from relying on statutory
provisions or contractual clauses in order to refuse to compensate those
victims for an accident caused by the insured vehicle</i>.’ [para 20]<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn18" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[18]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/motor-insurance-consideration-of-the-vnuk-judgment">https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/motor-insurance-consideration-of-the-vnuk-judgment</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn19" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[19]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Francovich,v Italian Republic and Bonifaci
and others v. Italian Republic</i> [1992] IRLR 84 (Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90)<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn20" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[20]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/350345/2017-supplementary-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/350345/2017-supplementary-uninsured-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn21" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[21]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Neither of which are permitted by the Directive, see the ECJ rulings in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Bernaldez 1996</i>, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Candolin 2005</i>, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Churchill
2011</i>. The terrorism exclusion produced anomalies due to the widely scope
definition adopted from the terrorism.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The result being that the MIB would be liable for an injury caused by a
fleeing bank robber or murder but not a fleeing GM arsonist.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn22" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[22]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/355104/amended-2017-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales_v10.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/355104/amended-2017-untraced-drivers-agreement-england-scotland-and-wales_v10.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn23" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[23]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166886/2003-england-scotland-and-wales-untraced-drivers-agreement.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/166886/2003-england-scotland-and-wales-untraced-drivers-agreement.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn24" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[24]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Ellitts
& Wilson & MIB</i> [2015] EWCA (unreported, 11 May 2015) Blair J upheld
this clause being invoked against a ten-year-old passenger where his mother
reasonably (but erroneously) believed that the responsible driver had correctly
identified himself and provided his full insurance details.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn25" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[25]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Previously conceded in a similar provision in the UDA 1999 in July 2015<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn26" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[26]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/352780/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-notes-for-guidance-v2-0.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/352780/2015-uninsured-drivers-agreement-notes-for-guidance-v2-0.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>and <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media/358739/untraced-notes-for-guidance-v10.pdf">https://www.mib.org.uk/media/358739/untraced-notes-for-guidance-v10.pdf</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn27" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[27]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Supra</i><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn28" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[28]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
This is outstanding<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn29" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn29;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[29]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See: <a href="https://kerryunderwood.wordpress.com/2017/02/08/new-mib-untraced-drivers-scheme-insurers-at-it-again/">https://kerryunderwood.wordpress.com/2017/02/08/new-mib-untraced-drivers-scheme-insurers-at-it-again/</a>
<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn30" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn30;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[30]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Conflicts of Interest?,</i> Nicholas Bevan,
NLJ, 3 March 2017<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn31" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn31;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[31]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
The need for better governance of the MIB is argued at some length in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Reforming the Motor Insurers Bureau, Part 1
the MIB’s role</i>, Nicholas Bevan, JPIL, 2011 Issue 1.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn32" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn32;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[32]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
For the MIB’s narrative explaining the change, see: <a href="https://www.mib.org.uk/media-centre/news/2017/february/mib-clarifies-who-can-submit-a-claim-untraced-drivers-agreement/">https://www.mib.org.uk/media-centre/news/2017/february/mib-clarifies-who-can-submit-a-claim-untraced-drivers-agreement/</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The original 10 January 2017 version has
since been removed from the MIB website.<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn33" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn33;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[33]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
Access the transcript online at: <a href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2017/2725.html">http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2017/2725.html</a><span class="MsoHyperlink"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn34" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn34;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[34]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
The transcript is available online at: <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-413/15">http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-413/15</a><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> , see also my blog: <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">State Liability: betwixt a</i> <a href="http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2017/11/mib-liable-for-gaps-in-road-traffic-act.html">http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2017/11/mib-liable-for-gaps-in-road-traffic-act.html</a><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn35" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn35;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[35]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See my submission in which I explain how my research and published articles
anticipated this development<o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn36" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<a href="file:///D:/%23%20Nota%20Bene%20Blog/2020/JUly%202020%20Book%20End.docx#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn36;" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span face="" style="font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;">[36]</span></span><!--[endif]--></span></span></a>
See <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">State Liability: betwixt and between
Brexit</i>, Nicholas Bevan, NLJ, 37 October 27 and 3 November 2017, available
online at:<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i><a href="http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2017/11/mib-liable-for-gaps-in-road-traffic-act.html">http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/2017/11/mib-liable-for-gaps-in-road-traffic-act.html</a><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
</div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-70501750618796813372020-02-28T16:15:00.000+00:002020-03-04T12:35:07.016+00:00SUPREME COURT REFUSES PERMISSION TO APPEAL TO THE MOTOR INSURERS' BUREAU <br />
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On 13 February the Supreme Court refused the Motor Insurers' Bureau (MIB) permission to
appeal against the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal in <i>MIB v Lewis
[2019] EWCA Civ 909</i>.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The clarity resulting from this final decision frees a number of pending actions against the Motor Insurers Bureau and the Secretary of State for Transport, to proceed; I am involved in two of these.</div>
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The Court of Appeal's ruling last year resolved a long-standing
controversy concerning the MIB’s true legal status under European law principles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Its two principal findings were: (i) the MIB
is an emanation of the state and (ii) that it is bound by the direct effect of
Articles 3 and 10 of the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103 (the
Directive), which prescribe the nature and extent of compulsory third-party
motor insurance. I had been alone in consistently arguing for both these outcomes for a number of years.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In practical terms, this ruling fixes the MIB with an entirely new category of
liability, independently of those under (i) its contractual
obligations with the Secretary of State for Transport, currently set out in the
Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 (UDA) and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2017
(UtDA) and (ii) its statutory obligations under the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory
Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003. <o:p></o:p></div>
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This new liability is based on directly applicable European
law, which will survive as retained EU law unless and until this outcome is
reversed by the Secretary of State for Transport after the Brexit implementation
period.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br />
<br />
Under this new law the MIB is
obliged to compensate motor accident victims who have been wrongly denied a
compensatory guarantee through compulsory insurance due to the government’s
failure to implement fully Article 3 of the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive
2009/103 (the Directive) within the provisions of Part VI of the Road Traffic
Act 1988 (the 1988 Act) and the EC Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Article 3’s direct effect</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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The Article 3 requires every member state to ‘take all
appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of
vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance’. In Part 1 of
this feature, Article 3’s broad and inclusive scope was compared with the UK’s
narrower transposition within sections 143 and 145 of the 1988 Act and found to
be wanting.<o:p></o:p></div>
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This non-conformity is likely to generate the following new
classes of action against the MIB: <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b>The first and most obvious</b> category in the light of the
Lewis case facts are claims caused by uninsured vehicles on private land and
inside private premises. The 1988 Act wrongly confines the scope of compulsory
motor insurance to roads or other public places. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>In the next category</b>, are accidents caused by a wide range
of motor vehicles that are wrongly excluded from the Directive’s compulsory
insurance requirement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Section 185’s
definition of ‘motor vehicle’ is confined to vehicles that are ‘adapted or
intended for road use’.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Whereas the
Article 3 insurance requirement is much wider and applies to ‘any motor vehicle
intended for travel on land …’. <o:p></o:p></div>
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Accordingly, the MIB is exposed to a new raft of claims for
loss or injury caused by a bewilderingly wide range of off-road motorised
transport, some of which were not envisioned when the Road Traffic Act was
reiterated, in 1988.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These range from
huge construction site dumpsters to the diminutive segways; even kinetically
powered bicycles.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>A third category</b> arises out of the way section 145 of the
1988 Act only requires the personal liability of the policyholder to be
covered.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In Driverless vehicles: future
perfect? (Pt 2), New Law Journal, 30 November 2018 this author argued that the
government’s failure to ensure that mechanical or software defects is included
in nits compulsory third-party motor requirement infringed the Directive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is because Article 3, by contrast, is
set in much broader terms with its requirement ‘that civil liability in respect
of the use of vehicles … is covered by insurance’. Although this hypothesis is
untested, it is consistent with a ruling by Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) on 20 June this year in <i>Línea Directa Aseguradora, SA v
Segurcaixa, Sociedad Anónima de Seguros y Reaseguros</i> [2019]. Here the CJEU held
that the scope of Article 3’s insurance requirement embraces a liability
arising from a vehicle spontaneously bursting into flames after it had been
parked inside a garage for at least 24 hours. It held that the vehicle’s parked
status was an integral part of its use as a means of transport. It also ruled
that to establish liability under Article 3, it was not necessary to identify
the particular fault responsible for the fire or the particular function that
part performed. The ruling also bears out part of this author’s criticism of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in <i>Pilling v UK Insurance Ltd </i>[2019] UKSC 16: see
<i>Phoneix in Flames</i>, New Law Journal,17 May 2017.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>A fourth application</b> of the direct effect of Article 3 would
appear to be cases where some insurance was in place for the vehicle
responsible but where the insurer has been able to rely on non-conforming
provisions of UK law to evade its contractual liability (under the policy) as
well as its statutory liability (under section 151(5) of the 1988 Act) due to
one or other of the following: (i) the policy being declared void under s152(2)
on the grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation at the policy’s inception, for
example: see <i>Colley v Shuker & or</i>s [2019] EWHC 781 (QB) or (ii) where the
policyholder has breached a policy term whose effect against a third party
claim is not nullified by sections 148 or 151 of the 1988 Act, as occurred in
<i>EUI v Bristol Alliance Limited Partnership</i> [2012] EWCA Civ 1267 and S<i>ahin v
Havard</i> [2016] EWCA Civ 1202. Hitherto, such claims have been treated as
uninsured or untraced driver claims under the UDA or the Untraced Drivers
Agreement 2017 (UtDA).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This practice was
endorsed recently by the Supreme Court in <i>Cameron v</i> <i>Liverpool Victoria
Insurance Co Ltd</i> [2019] UKSC 6; wrongly so in this author’s view.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These domestic authorities flout three
consistent CJEU rulings to the effect that the Article 10 body (whose role the
MIB discharges) has no authority to intervene if the vehicle responsible had
policy was in place at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim. The
MIB’s role is confined to situations where the vehicle responsible is (i)
unidentified or (ii) where no policy is in place at the time of the incident,
see <i>Gábor Csonka v Magyar Állam </i>Case C 409/11 [2013] (paragraphs 30 to 32) and
<i>Fidelidade-Companhia de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse de Compensation</i> (Case
C-287/16) [2017]. Only one policy exclusion can be invoked against a third
party and this only applies to a passenger who gets into the vehicle knowing it
to have been stolen; not otherwise: see <i>Katja Candolin</i> (Case C-537/03)
[2015].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thanks to the Lewis appeal, the
direct effect of Articles 3 and 10 allows the Supreme Court’s erroneous
decision in Cameron to be challenged and, if necessary, referred to the CJEU
for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. <o:p></o:p></div>
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All these claims are based on directly effective rights
conferred under the Directive. They are not UDA claims, see below.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Article 10’s direct effect</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Because the MIB has been officially classified as an
emanation of the state and because both Articles 3 and 10 have direct effect
against it, any non-conforming provisions within both the UDA and the UtDA are
now much easier to challenge, at least during the Brexit implementation period
whilst the supremacy of European law subsists.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
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The MIB agreements still retain restrictions and exclusions
of liability that are not permitted under the Directive and these are now
subject to judicial scrutiny by direct comparison with the wording of Articles
3 and 10 of the Directive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This new
remedy circumvents the problem caused by the House of Lords ruling in <i>White v
White</i>, [2001] UKHL 9 where it that held because the MIB schemes were not
legislation they were not susceptible to a Marleasing style remedial
construction to bring them into line with the Directive’s objectives. Arguably
the White ruling had been superseded by <i>Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz</i>
(C-297/01) [2004], which extends the courts obligation to undertake a
consistent / purposive construction of any national rule or law implementing a
directive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The MIB’s emanation of state
status precludes it from relying on the CJEU ruling in <i>Smith v Meade</i> Case
C-122/17 [2018] that prevents a the Directive from having a ‘horizontal’ direct
effect against a private organisation, such as an insurer.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<h3>
Potential Article 10 challenges</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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I list a few of the most obvious examples, these are merely
indicative of a wider range of potential construction challenges of the MIB
Agreements, based on the direct effect principle:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>The first</b> arises from the way the MIB breaches the
equivalence principle, considered above, in cl 6 of both the UDA<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>and the UtDA by asserting the right to offset
other sources of recovery and or under cl 6 (3) ibid for failing to present a
claim against another insurer potentially liable to make a payment in respect
of the same incident; when no such right exists under the normal civil
liability rules that apply to insured defendants. Arguably this breaches the
equivalence principle mentioned below.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>A second example</b> concerns the way the MIB has subverted the
legislative intention of Article 10(3)’s permission to exclude liability for
property damage in an untraced vehicle claim where there has been no
‘significant injury’ sustained in the incident giving rise to the claim.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The MIB Agreements define ‘significant
injury’ in terms that amount to a ‘grievous’ or ‘serious’ injury threshold in
cl 1 of the UtDA 2003 and cl 7 of the UtDA 2017. Whereas the European
Commission’s explanatory memorandum made it clear this is intended as an
anti-fraud measure; not a serious injury threshold.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
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<b>A third example</b>: concerns the way cl 8(1)(b) of both the UDA
and the UtDA purport to exclude liability to a passenger who at the time of the
accident knew that the vehicle had been unlawfully taken and had not attempted
to alight from it as soon as reasonably possible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The only permitted exclusion in Article 10
requires actual knowledge when entering the vehicle (not later) that it has
been stolen. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
What sort of claim?</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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These newly coined direct effect actions are an admixture of
conventional tort law and public law principles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, because the need for such actions
results from the government’s failure to bring the accident circumstances
within the UK’s compensatory guarantee, they should be run as ordinary personal
injury claims.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<h3>
Limits of liability</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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In the first instance decision in Lewis it was mooted that
the minimum level of compensatory award set by Article 9 of the Directive
(currently EUR 1.2m) might serve as a cap on the MIB’s liability under direct
effect principles.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>That is not correct,
due to the application of the European law principle of equivalence, see (Case
C-63/01) <i>Evans v Secretary of State for Transport</i> [2003] . Accordingly, the
1988 Act’s property damage limit of £1.2m applies but there is no financial
limit to the personal injury damages.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Brexit’s effect</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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The Court of Appeal’s finding that the 1988 Act fails to
conform with the unrestricted geographic scope of the Directive, that the MIB
is an emanation of the state and that both Articles 3 and 10 of the Directive
have direct effect against it, will all endure as retained EU law under s4(1)
of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. Individual claimants will continue to be able to
invoke they direct effect of these principles during the Brexit transition period (which expires on 31 December 2020) and beyond (as retained EU law), notwithstanding
that abolition of the primacy of EU law under s5.<br />
<br />
However, it should be noted that the amendments introduced in 2020 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 confer a ministerial discretion to modify, after the implementation period, various statutory instruments such as the EC Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002 under s7 of the amended Act of 2018. There are also wide powers to revise retained EU law under s8 where a minister of state considers that there is a deficiency in EU law or where, in the minister's view, it is not operating effectively. Furthermore, the amendments to s6 are arguably even more radical in the way they licence a departure from retained EU case law. It confers a constitutionally unprecedented power on ministers to prescribe by regulation a mandatory test that the courts must apply when deciding whether it is appropriate to exercise their new power under s6(4) to depart from retained EU case law. Two obvious candidates for revision are the CJEU's rulings in <span style="font-family: "verdana" , sans-serif; font-size: 9pt;"><i>Damijan
Vnuk</i> C 162/13 [2014] and </span><span style="font-family: "verdana" , sans-serif; font-size: 9pt;"><i>Farrell
v Whitty</i> and Others (no 2) Case C</span><span style="font-family: "cambria math" , serif; font-size: 9pt;">‑</span><span style="font-family: "verdana" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 9pt;">413/15 [2017]. Both of these decisions exposed the UK's </span><span style="font-size: 12px;">contumacious</span><span style="font-size: 9pt;"> infringement of EU law and they were critical to both the first instance decision and appellate ruling in </span></span><i style="font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 9pt;">Lewis</i><span style="font-family: "verdana" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: 9pt;">. Given that the government has failed to honour its repeated assurances to bring the geographic scope of the Road Traffic Act 1988 into line with the EU law for over four years , it seems highly likely that, by one route or another, the <i>Lewis </i>ruling will be effectively reversed.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "verdana" , sans-serif; font-size: 9pt;"><br /></span></div>
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In the meantime, it remains to be seen where the courts will draw the line on
the wider implications of this ruling, especially where a different domestic
non-conforming provision is challenged (i.e. one that has not yet been recognised as such by a domestic court). <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-81954795623507353132019-07-30T17:22:00.001+01:002020-02-17T14:55:14.259+00:00<br />
<h2>
The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Regulations 2019</h2>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Introduced to Parliament on 1 July 2019.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Section 152 Road Traffic Act 1988 to be reformed once more</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Once an insured risk has materialised, a motor insurer will no longer be able to avoid its statutory liability to
compensate third party victims on the grounds that the policyholder deceived them when the motor policy was taken out. </div>
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The section 152 declaration procedure, widely employed by motor insurers to deflect claims to the relatively disadvantageous scheme managed by the Motor Insurers' Bureau under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 is effectively abolished and not before time!<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h2>
Two campaign victories!</h2>
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June and July 2019 have been very satisfactory months from
my perspective.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>They have delivered two
major reforms on issues that I was first to raise and then to campaign to reform.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
<o:p> </o:p>Reform 1: MIB v Lewis [2019] EWCA Civ 909</h3>
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In June 2019 the Court of Appeal's ruling in MIB v Lewis
confirmed something that I have been contending for, for the past twelve
years.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It ruled that the Motor Insurers'
Bureau is an emanation of the state and that this status fixes it with a
liability to compensate motor accident victims adversely affected by the governments
failure to fully implement the civil law rights conferred under the European
Directive 2009/103/EC.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This has far
reaching implications, some of which I allude to in this blog in my earlier postings
this month [see The MIB's Surrogate Liability].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Reform 2: Abolition of section 152(2) Road Traffic Act 1988 declarations under Regulation 6 of The Motor Vehicles (Compulsory
Insurance) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019</h3>
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See: <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/1047/contents/made"><span style="color: blue;">http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/1047/contents/made</span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
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The government’s explanatory note has this to say:<o:p></o:p></div>
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'Regulation 6 amends section 152 of the Road Traffic Act
1988 (c. 52) to limit the rights of an insurer to rely on having voided an
insurance policy after an accident has taken place. Regulation 7 makes an
equivalent change for Northern Ireland and amends section 98A of the Road
Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981. Regulation 8 is a saving provision for
any court declarations obtained prior to 1st November 2019.'</div>
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A long overdue reform</h3>
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I believe that I was first to argue (in my Journal of Personal Injury Law commentary on Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 in 2012 and on several occasions in the New Law Journal, subsequently, that
the ability of insurers to obtain a court declaration that exculpates <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>them from any responsibility to compensate
victims where a policy was induced by fraud or misrepresentation under s152
Road Traffic Act 1988 - was unlawful. I explained that this statutory provision
failed to conform with the autonomous compensatory guarantee vouchsafed by
Directive 2009/103 and a line of consistent Court of Justice rulings to this
effect dating back to <i>Bernaldez </i>[1996] ECR 1-1929.<br />
<o:p></o:p><br />
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<b>Excerpt </b>from my 2017 article Inception Deception: '<i>Motor insurers have relied increasingly on 152 RTA 1988 in recent years, particularly in high value claims. It is a uniformly accepted convention that once a court declaration under s 152 (2) is made, the insurer is released from any direct liability to meet a third-party claim, whether contractually or statutorily imposed (ie under either s 151 of RTA 1988 or Reg 3 of the Rights Against Insurers Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/3061). ....This author first criticised this approach for being inconsistent with the protective purpose of the Directives in his JPIL commentary on Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532 and again in this journal on 8 February 2013 in ‘On the right road? Pt II’, (see 163 NLJ, 7547 p 130) Fidelidade has vindicated this view</i>.'<br />
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I also raised this particular issue initially in various
consultation responses to the Department of Transport.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>When this was ignored, after a long campaign,
I manage to persuade RoadPeace to include this issue as one of the numerous
grounds where we sought judicial review in 2015.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The strength of my argument was later reinforced
by the Court of Justice’s ruling in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Fidelidade-Compania
de Seguros SA v Caisse Suisse de Compensation</i><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>C-287/16.</div>
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It was remarkable that Mr
Justice Ouseley’s judgment in in <i>RoadPeace v Secretary of State for Transport and Motor Insurers' Bureau</i> [2017] EWHC 2725 condoned this clear and blatant
infringement of European law by misconstruing, in the most strained terms, the inescapable implications of <i>Fidelidade</i>, when dismissing this
particular ground of the judicial review. </div>
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Although the <i>RoadPeace</i> judicial review was instrumental
in forcing the MIB to introduce major reforms to both compensation schemes
and although it resulted in additional declarations of the UK's non-conformity with EU law, the
judgment obtusely rejected our claims that this and number of other similar statutory
provisions flouted EU law. The spectre of Brexit appears to have had a tangible
effect. After three long years of extensive pro bono work, we were forced to
leave this highly unsatisfactory decision where it lay, unchallenged.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The fact that the government has forced through this reform,
presumably in the face of stiff opposition from the motor insurance lobby (who
rely on section 152 avoidance declarations as a staple first line of defence,
especially in serious injury claims where they face extensive liabilities) makes
it abundantly clear that the government accepts that Ouseley J got this (and in
my view much else) badly wrong in 2017.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">Immediate effect through direct effect</span></h3>
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Although these regulations only come into force on 1 November
2019 (on day one of Brexit *) their effect can be invoked against the MIB with
immediate and retrospective effect, following the Court of Appeal’s decision in
MIB v Lewis.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span>
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">[* After this article was posted, Brexit day was postponed by three months] </span></div>
<h3>
Worrisome developments at APIL</h3>
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As to section 152 Road Traffic Act 1988 generally, I had
proposed to deliver a webinar (<b>Winning the unwinnable claim Part 2</b>) for the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers,
explaining why Mr Justice O’Farrell’s recent decision in Colley v Shuker [2019]
EWHC 781 (QB) which upheld the effect of an insurer’s revocation of its cover
under section 152 of the 1988 Act was misconceived and contrary to EU law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I also intended to cover four new Court of Justice
rulings, to explain where the Supreme Court went wrong in its decision in Pilling v UK Insurance and to explain how, after MIB v Lewis, claimants can pursue direct personal
injury actions against the MIB where a policy has been revoked by invoking the
same European law directly against the MIB, as though the 1988 Act fully implemented
the Directive – only to have my training proposal rejected on the basis that it
raised no new point of law. How bizarre! <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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As a senior fellow and longstanding member of APIL, who has supported its charitable objectives in different ways over several decades, I am becoming increasingly baffled and concerned by the internal politics
that are corroding the credibility and quality of APIL’s training and accreditation
schemes.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The big question</h2>
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If the government is able to implement the effect of <i>Fidelidade’s</i>
ruling from 2017, why has it not implemented the <i>Vnuk</i> ruling from 2014. </div>
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The government conceded that the scope of the
UK’s compulsory third party motor insurance regime failed to implement the
Directive’s unrestricted scope both within the <i>RoadPeace</i> judicial review and in its consultation on <i>Vnuk</i>. Were are
now five years on from <i>Vnuk</i> and three years on from the governments promise to
act. I suspect that the prospect of a Brexit is influencing events but what has that to do with the rule of law?<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-29203021572865638372019-07-28T13:51:00.001+01:002019-07-29T09:48:41.728+01:00THE MIB’s SURROGATE LIABILITY (Part 2)<h2>
The implications of Motor Insurers’ Bureau v Lewis [2019]
EWCA Civ 909</h2>
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<h3>
Part 2 goes to press</h3>
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The second article, in my two-part feature on Lewis, was
published this Friday in the New Law Journal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>The first instalment explained the reasoning behind the Court of Appeal’s
two confirmatory findings: (i) that the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) is an
emanation of the state; (ii) that Articles 3 and 10 of the Motor Insurance
Directive (2009/103) have direct effect against it. The second article sets out
some of the wide-ranging and potentially disruptive ramifications of this
ruling.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
The key implications of the Lewis ruling are twofold. </h3>
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<b>First</b>, the MIB is fixed with a vicarious form of liability
to redress any gaps in the compensatory guarantee vouchsafed by the third-party
motor insurance regime in the UK. A key
point that the commentaries I have read and heard all miss is that this is a general
principle that has a wide and encompassing application. It is not confined to
the facts of the case (e.g. claims featuring a motor accident on private land where
the compulsory insurance provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not apply)
but to all other instances where our national provision fails to fully implement
the Directive. The impact is major, reflecting
as it does the egregious and wide-ranging infringements of EU law in the UK’s
transposition of the Directive. For example,
uncompensated victims of motor accidents caused by mechanical and software
defects, or unusual vehicles (neither of which scenarios are covered by the UK
regime, in clear breach of EU law) can now pursue a direct action against the
MIB. The EU law principle of equivalence requires that these claims are to be
governed by the normal civil procedural rules that apply to conventional
personal injury claims; not the disadvantageous provisions of the Uninsured
Drivers Agreement 2015. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<b>A second</b> (major) collateral effect of Lewis is that the MIB
Agreements themselves are now subject to a curative construction that bring
their non-conforming provisions into line with the minimum standard of compensatory
provision mandated under EU law. All this and more is explained in my New Law
Journal Article, The MIB’s surrogate state liability (Pt 2).<o:p></o:p></div>
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Why did it take so long?</h3>
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It took 12 years for the erroneous first instance findings in
Byrne v MIB and the Secretary of State for Transport 2007 to be challenged in
the UK. In Byrne, Flaux J (now Lord Justice Flaux) was not informed of consistent
line of domestic authorities, which were determinative on the issue, concerning
the correct approach to take when applying the Foster criteria for deciding
whether a legal entity is to be treated as though it were part of the state and
thus potentially subject to the direct effect of incompletely implemented rights
conferred under a directive. That same court
was also badly misinformed on the facts. The MIB and the Secretary of State for
Transport withheld an abundance of highly relevant material (documents and
facts) that would, in my view, have established that the extensive control
exercised by the minister over the MIB’s compensatory role and the special
powers it enjoyed in this capacity; confer it with a special status as an
emanation of the state. <o:p></o:p><br />
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These important issues were not pressed by the claimant at
the time. This was an entirely justifiable
tactic in the circumstances of the particular case: the claimant team’s imperative
was to focus its limited resources, in what had become an expensive litigation,
to the key issues necessary to establishing one of two alternative successful
outcomes. Its case concentrated on the near certainty that the court would find
the government liable under an alternative ground based on Francovich state
liability principles; where it succeeded ultimately in the Court of Appeal. </div>
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Unfortunately, Flaux J’s erroneous finding (on
the alternative ground) as to the MIB’s state liability under Foster principles
proved to be a dead-weight deterrent for numerous claimants thereafter (probably
numbered in their thousands).<o:p></o:p></div>
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It took a ruling from the Court of Justice of the European
Union in Farrell v Whitty (no 2) in 2018 to embolden a leading firm in an
otherwise predominantly lack-lustre claimant personal injury sector, to bring
the long overdue challenge in Lewis.
Farrell is on all fours with the domestic authorities on state liability
that were completely overlooked eleven years before in Byrne. Its
finding on special powers coincided with my long-held view that the MIB’s compensatory
role, which is funded through its imposition of a levy on all UK motor insurers
as a precondition to authorised status in the UK, constituted a special power,
which satisfied the criteria for emanation of the state status. The
implications of Farrell (no 2) were as obvious as they were ineluctable. However, it is striking that none of probably
thousands of claimants were advised to challenge Byrne's evidently flawed findings on the MIB’s
proper status, until Farrell (no2). <o:p></o:p></div>
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The 12-year hiatus of unjust outcomes from Byrne to Lewis neatly
illustrates the sorry plight of individual claimants in our civil justice
system. Although the Civil Procedural Rules
profess to impose equality between the parties, their failure to achieve this is
abject: access to Justice is anything but equal. </div>
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This is partly due to the fact, as the Byrne
case illustrates, that multi-national and state parties are free to bend the
rules when it suits them, with apparent impunity. Costs sanctions imposed for
unreasonable conduct is a worthwhile risk where a distorted outcome might result
in a windfall of £millions. The multi-£bn
motor insurance sector plays a vital and largely beneficial role in our society.
Unfortunately, its powerful lobby has distorted our national law provision for
compulsory insurance by obstructing much needed reform, over many decades, and
it is able to invest disproportionate sums in civil actions to achieve partial
and unmerited outcomes that serve its strategic aims. Whilst successive governments
are responsible for excessive court fees and the abolition of legal aid which
drastically curb access to justice, the judiciary have also contributed to the
problem which deters many if not most private citizens from challenging abuses
of power. Rupert Jackson’s dogmatic proposals for curbing legal costs through
arbitrarily derived fixed fees, Draconian procedural penalties, and though the imposition
of arcane cost recovery principles (such as the proportionality principle that
imposes an arbitrary cap on recoverable costs in a Procrustean fashion) has made
civil litigation an unjust process where disparities in resources is routinely
exploited by wealthy institutions at the expense of private litigants. </div>
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As a
solicitor of many years standing it has also been disheartening to witness the recent
startling decline in the quality of the Supreme Court’s judgments in this area.
I can only hope that the Cameron and Pilling rulings in February and March this
year, which I appear to be alone in robustly criticising (see my New Law
Journal articles and my earlier posts in this blog) are anomalies that will never
be repeated. It is also equally startling to note that none of my fellow
commentators and law reporters featuring these two appalling rulings recognise the
blatant misstatements of fact and law within them. <o:p></o:p></div>
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Brexit’s effect</h3>
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<h2>
<o:p></o:p></h2>
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The findings that (i) the 1988 Act fails to conform with the
unrestricted geographic scope of the Directive, (ii) that the MIB is an
emanation of the state and (iii) that both Articles 3 and 10 of the Directive
have direct effect against it, will all endure as retained EU law under s4(1)
of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. Accordingly, individual claimants will be able
to invoke the direct effect of these findings beyond a Brexit notwithstanding
that abolition of the primacy of EU law under s5.<o:p></o:p></div>
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It remains to be seen where the courts will draw the line on
the wider implications of this ruling, especially where a domestic non-conforming
provision has not yet been recognised as such on Brexit. It is also by no means certain that claimant law firms will exploit these newly confirmed rights to the full extent.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-54864264362470465632019-07-16T10:53:00.002+01:002019-07-16T17:30:43.822+01:00THE MIB's SURROGATE LIABILITY<br />
<h2>
Motor Insurers’ Bureau v Lewis [2019] EWCA Civ 909</h2>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br />
The first instalment of my two-part feature in the New Law
Journal was published on 12 July. It explains how the scattergun tactics employed
by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB), in its futile appeal against Soole J’s
first instance decision has proved to be a costly mistake.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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The MIB has appealed Soole J’s finding that it was bound by
the direct effect of Article 3 of the Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103 (the
Directive) under EU law. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Article 3 prescribes
the minimum standard of civil liability insurance necessary to deliver a
consistent level of compensatory guarantee is conferred on third party motor
accident victims throughout the EU and EEA. <o:p></o:p></div>
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In Lewis, the claimant was grievously injured when he was
run down by an uninsured car in a privately-owned field, which location does
not fall within the geographic scope of the Part VI of the Road Traffic Act
1988 that regulates the compulsory insurance requirement in the UK. The MIB had
rejected the claimant’s application arguing that it had no liability under the
Uninsured Drivers Agreement on the basis that its contractual liability under that
agreement is coextensive with the statutory insurance obligation.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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The first instance decision confirmed that the UK legislation
infringed the Directive on this point.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>Furthermore, it held that as it was bound by the Court of Justice of the
European Union’s ruling in<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>(Case C<span style="font-family: "cambria math" , serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "Cambria Math";">‑</span>413/15)
Farrell v Whitty and Others (no 2) [2017], the MIB’s role in discharging the
state’s obligation, imposed under Article 10 of the Directive, to authorise a
compensating body to meet claims by victims of uninsured vehicles, pinned it
with state liability to compensate victims wrongly denied the compensatory guarantee
through insurance provision due to the government’s defective implementation.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The MIB’s unsuccessful appeal has served to compound its problems.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<ul>
<li>First, the Court of Appeal has upheld the first instance finding
that the MIB is fixed with state liability (due to its emanation of the state
status) to compensate victims affected by the government’s failure to fully implement
Article 3 of the Directive (which provision met the criteria of unconditionality
and sufficient precision to qualify for direct effect);</li>
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<li>Second, the court went on to rule that the Article 10 also
qualified for direct effect against the MIB.</li>
</ul>
In the second instalment, to be published shortly, I consider
the far-reaching implication of both findings. <o:p></o:p><br />
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<li>I will explain how direct effect of Article 3 against the
MIB leaves it exposed to an extraordinary range of novel extra-statutory liabilities,
derived independently of its contractual obligations with the state.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is fixed, under directly applicable EU
law, to compensate victims injured or sustaining loss in a diverse range of
scenarios that ought to be covered by the compulsory third party insurance requirement,
but which are not, due to the UK’s longstanding infringements of the Directive.
Any proper analysis reveals some surprising outcomes (unprecedented, even).</li>
</ul>
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<li>I will also explain how the direct effect of Article 10 of
the Directive against the MIB can be used to circumvent the House of Lords
ruling in White v White in 2001 which hitherto has justified, wrongly so in my
view, the judiciary’s reluctance to remedy non-conforming provisions within
both the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement
2017 by subjecting their provisions to the EU law doctrine of consistent
construction. Although the RoadPeace judicial review I was behind in 2015-2018
was responsible for the excision of many blatantly unjust and arbitrary exclusions
of liability (on the ground that they infringed the directive), a significant
number remain.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These injustices can now
be challenged with facility, provided it can be established that they fall
below Article 10’s minimum standards to a disproportionate extent. </li>
</ul>
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wrbZKyigwQ8/XS2eeFQYozI/AAAAAAAABek/7ju-npNgKfUVfVo58kZzx8Ga11sfqrnBgCLcBGAs/s1600/NLJ%2BLewis%2Bpart%2B1.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="889" data-original-width="807" height="640" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wrbZKyigwQ8/XS2eeFQYozI/AAAAAAAABek/7ju-npNgKfUVfVo58kZzx8Ga11sfqrnBgCLcBGAs/s640/NLJ%2BLewis%2Bpart%2B1.JPG" width="579" /></a></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-84406433522893415722019-07-15T12:00:00.000+01:002019-07-16T13:56:26.000+01:00LAW COMMISSION ENDORSE NEED FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY REVIEW<br />
<h2>
Automated Vehicles and Liability for Vehicle Defects</h2>
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The Law Commission has published its initial response and recommendations
in its three year project that reviews the legal framework necessary to accommodate
the introduction on our roads of automated vehicles.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><a href="https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf" target="_blank"><img alt="https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf" border="0" data-original-height="769" data-original-width="733" height="400" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-UQzOU__ogE4/XS2s7WOWqRI/AAAAAAAABew/xFucum9j_sgaRKHKHyptf5GphJsRTUrCgCLcBGAs/s400/LC%2B1.JPG" title="" width="381" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/Summary-of-Automated-Vehicles-Analysis-of-Responses.pdf" target="_blank">LINK</a></td></tr>
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<span style="color: blue;"><a href="https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/AV019-Bevan-Nicholas.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;">In my response to Question 18</span></a> </span>of the Law Commissions’ preliminary
consultation on Automated Vehicles (Law Commission Consultation Paper 240;
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper 166) I argued the case for a wider
review of the compensatory protection afforded to motor accident victims under
the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Consumer Protection Act 1978.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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I explained that the no-fault liability under the Automated
& Electric Vehicles Act 2018 failed to address the very real and immediate
need for suitable cover for existing and near to market automation that present
the gravest threat to the public.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Only advanced
forms of automation (that have yet to be developed) or current levels automation
operating within highly restricted environments qualify for the protection
conferred under the 2018 Act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2019/06/AV019-Bevan-Nicholas.pdf" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;">In my answers to Question 7 and 18</span></a> I stress that section 145
of the Road Traffic Act 1988 only requires compulsory third-party cover to provide
an indemnity against the policyholder’s personal liability.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This appears to breach the wider insurance obligation
mandated under Article 3 of the Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103 (the
Directive) that extends to require civil liability cover for defects in the
vehicle, such as defective automation; that can result spontaneously,
independently of the policyholder or user’s fault. My views on this lacunae in our
national law provision have since been fully vindicated by the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See: (Case
C-100/18) Línea Directa Aseguradora, SA v Segurcaixa, Sociedad Anónima de
Seguros y Reaseguros of 20 June 2019. <o:p></o:p></div>
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It appears that my concerns about to this particular infringement
of the Directive, first raised by me in my consultation response to the Department
for Transport’s 2013 consultation on the MIB Agreements, has been acknowledged by
the Law Commission; albeit in oblique terms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
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In the Law Commission’s 19 June 2019 paper: Summary of the
Analysis of Responses to the Preliminary Consultation Paper it appears to
recommend that the government undertake a general review of product liability
for automated vehicles.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-s-Tv66zkPQY/XS2ttkORYAI/AAAAAAAABe4/rZJJZ4uZr5kG9QvPRDTI7dyjuft90I7pgCLcBGAs/s1600/LC%2B2.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="464" data-original-width="726" height="408" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-s-Tv66zkPQY/XS2ttkORYAI/AAAAAAAABe4/rZJJZ4uZr5kG9QvPRDTI7dyjuft90I7pgCLcBGAs/s640/LC%2B2.JPG" width="640" /></a></div>
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Unfortunately, the government has reneged on its commitment, made not only in
the RoadPeace judicial review in 2018 but also in its own consultation paper on
Vnuk in 2016, to bring the geographic scope of compulsory motor insurance under the Road Traffic Act 1988
into line with the wider remit of the Directive.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>With a hard Brexit looking increasingly likely and given the government's manifest and obdurate disregard of EU law on this issue and its long standing refusal to fully implement various other aspects the Directive
- I am not holding my breath.<br />
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<h3>
New remedy</h3>
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Fortunately however, victims who are injured by a mechanical or
software defect in a vehicle whose compensatory guarantee under EU law is frustrated by the responsible vehicle's insurer and / or the MIB refusing to compensate the claim on the basis that it is not a relevant liability (i.e. because the fault does not fall within section
145’s non-conforming scope) now have a new remedy.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><br />
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Claimants can now invoke the direct effect of Article
3 of the Directive in an ordinary personal injury action against the MIB, see my
blogs on the Court of Appeal ruling in MIB v Lewis 2019.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See also my New Law Journal articles which predicted
this outcome: <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">On the Right Road?</i> in
2013, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Putting Wrongs to Rights</i> 2016; <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">State Liability; betwixt and between Brexit</i>
in 2017 etc.<o:p></o:p><br />
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This new direct right allows the claimant to cite the wording of Articles 3 and 10 of the Directive as though they were fully incorporated into our national law, word for word, and to plead this in an ordinary civil / tort law action directly against the MIB.</div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-26635894314567965342019-06-11T14:54:00.002+01:002019-06-11T14:54:42.049+01:00WINNING THE UNWINNABLE MOTOR CLAIM<h2>
MIB v Lewis</h2>
<br />
<h3>
Lunchtime webinar on 19 June 2019 at 13.00 hrs</h3>
<br />
There has been a programme change to accommodate the ground-breaking implications of last week's Court of Appeal ruling in <i>Motor Insurers' Bureau v Lewis</i> 2019 EWCA Civ 909<br />
<br />
<b>Book now</b> via the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers at: <a href="https://www.apil.org.uk/"><span style="color: blue;">https://www.apil.org.uk</span></a><br />
<br />
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<span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt;">In a break with 73
years of jurisprudence, the Court of Appeal has fixed the UK motor insurance
industry’s’ privately-owned consortium, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, with a new
autonomous legal obligation to compensate outside the parameters of the Road Traffic
Act 1988. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Hlk11146862"><span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt;"><br />
Another important consequence of this ruling is that MIB Agreements are now
subject to an EU law conforming interpretation; applying EU law authorities
that effectively overrule an earlier House of Lords ruling to the contrary. <o:p></o:p></span></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "Arial",sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt;"><br />
Serious deficiencies in the Supreme Court’s rulings in <i>Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Assurance</i> [2109] and <i>Pilling v UK Insurance</i> [2019] may be
flagged up but a more detailed consideration will be covered in a separate
webinar, currently under preparation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GW3b1HJ-7oQ/XP-yDEwvmGI/AAAAAAAABeE/lQMIJt-IKJAMzlvXGTIVJKoCfmn2h9-XwCLcBGAs/s1600/band.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="266" data-original-width="997" height="106" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GW3b1HJ-7oQ/XP-yDEwvmGI/AAAAAAAABeE/lQMIJt-IKJAMzlvXGTIVJKoCfmn2h9-XwCLcBGAs/s400/band.JPG" width="400" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0ql2IKwP6b0/XP-yNaIeSfI/AAAAAAAABeM/46AJKDxPQlg2f0I3FhjIHdyQQbwPRLb5gCLcBGAs/s1600/June%2B2019%2BLewis%2Bflyer.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="893" data-original-width="866" height="400" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0ql2IKwP6b0/XP-yNaIeSfI/AAAAAAAABeM/46AJKDxPQlg2f0I3FhjIHdyQQbwPRLb5gCLcBGAs/s400/June%2B2019%2BLewis%2Bflyer.JPG" width="387" /></a></div>
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<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-22009645974864850172019-06-06T15:42:00.000+01:002019-06-08T09:13:37.457+01:00COURT OF APPEAL DISMISSES APPEAL BY MOTOR INSURERS' BUREAU IN LEWIS <br />
<h2>
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Motor Insurers’ Bureau
v Michael Lewis</i> [2019] EWCA Civ 909</h2>
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The Court of Appeal has ruled that:<br /><ul>
<li>The Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB) is an emanation of the
state under EU law.</li>
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<li>Articles 3 and 10 of the Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103/EC
that prescribe the compulsory motor insurance obligation and the role of the compensating
body authorised to compensate victims of unidentified and uninsured vehicles
are sufficiently clear and unconditional to have direct effect against the MIB.</li>
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These findings fix the MIB with a liability to compensate motor
accident victims whose compensatory entitlement ought to be guaranteed through
compulsory third party motor insurance but who are not due to the UK government’s
failure to properly implement the minimum standard of compensatory protection required
by the Motor Insurance Directives.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The MIB faces potentially hundreds of claims by individual
motor accident victims whose compensatory entitlement have been obstructed or
denied due to the government’s longstanding failure to implement basic EU law requirements
for motor insurance.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The MIB’s appeal against the first instance decision in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Lewis v Tindale</i> & MIB [2018] EWHC 2376 (QB) was resoundingly dismissed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is an unanimously endorsed ruling.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In presenting the only reasoned judgment, Lord
Justice Flaux, rejected the MIB’s numerous arguments one after the other.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The Court of Appeal has ruled, in decisive terms, that not
only does the MIB’s compensatory role under the Uninsured Drivers Agreement
2015 and the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2017 make it an emanation of the state
in this context, but it is also pinned with liability to compensate motor
accident victims who have been wrongly denied the compensatory guarantee mandated
by Articles 3 and 10 of the Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103 due to the
government’s <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>failure to properly
transpose its requirements within the Road Traffic Act 1988 and under its
private law agreements with the MIB.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Flaux LJ’s involvement might strike some as poetic justice
for the MIB, since this ruling overturns his earlier decision in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Byrne v MIB</i> [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) in
which he had previously ruled that (i) the MIB was not an emanation of the
state so that (ii) the provisions of the Motor Insurance Directives could not
have direct effect against it. I have argued over several years, in my New Law
Journal articles, that the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Byrne</i> judgment
was wrong on these points.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>First in February
2013 later in more detail in my two-part feature, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Putting wrongs to rights</i>, 27 May and 3 June 2016. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I did so again, following the Court of Justice’s
ruling in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Farrell v Whitty No. 2</i>
(Case C-413/15) [2018] in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">State Liability:
betwixt and between Brexit</i> (Parts 1 and 2) 27 October 2017 and 3 November
2017.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I inferred from the judgment in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Byrne</i> that information relevant to the
MIB’s close working relationship with the government was withheld from the court
and I asserted that the learned judge was also misinformed on the proper
approach to determining whether a body is an emanation of the state.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It was noticeable at the appeal hearing in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Lewis</i> that Flaux LJ was extremely well
informed, which was evident from his timely and apposite interventions.<o:p></o:p></div>
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I will be presenting a lunchtime webinar on 19 June 2019 for the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers on the wide-reaching
implications of this important ruling.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
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The MIB’s exposure to liability extends far beyond the terms
of its private law agreements with the Secretary of State for Transport; beyond
even the governments failure to ensure that compulsory third party motor
insurance extends to private land: it opens up new areas of claim previously thought
to be untouched by third party motor insurance and the Road Traffic Act 1988.<o:p></o:p></div>
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I understand that the Court of Appeal have already refused the
MIB leave to appeal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the MIB
have indicated that they intend to apply to the Supreme Court for permission to
appeal, regardless. I think the MIB would be wise to think twice about that.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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If the MIB plan to pursue their empty technical argument
that Articles 3 and 10 of the Motor Insurance Directive are insufficiently clear
and unconditional to qualify for direct effect then that is likely to <u>oblige</u>
the Supreme Court to refer the issue to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under
Article 267 TFEU. The autonomous nature of the EU law motor insurance
obligation requires this; it is not something that lies within the Supreme Court’s
discretion.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The European Commission and the
CJEU are well aware of the UK’s extensive non-conformity with EU law in this
area and it so may result in a crystal clear exposition of just how extensive
the MIB’s liability is.<o:p></o:p></div>
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The UK remains the subject of a wide-ranging infringement complaint
that has lain dormant following the 2016 Brexit referendum.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, any Article 267 reference is likely
to be expedited in the face of an impending Brexit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-63565226924394537432019-06-06T14:18:00.000+01:002019-06-06T14:18:19.540+01:00PILLING V UK INSURANCE (part 2)<br />
<h2>
Phoenix in flames: lessons from Pilling (Part 2)</h2>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
R & S Pilling t/a Phoenix Engineering v UK Insurance Ltd
[2019] UKSC 16</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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In the first instalment of my commentary on Pilling Part I,
see earlier blog, I note that the Supreme Court failed to apply the correct approach
to interpreting national implementing law consistently with the objectives of a
directive it is supposed to transpose into UK law.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In deciding that it was not possible to ‘read
down’ section s145 Road Traffic Act 1988 with a conforming construction that
included private property within the geographic scope of compulsory insurance
it failed to apply the legal presumption mandated by the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) n <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Pfeiffer v
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz</i> (Case C-297/01) [2004]. This requirement dates back
to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Wagner Miret</i> (Case C 334/92)
[1993] and is set out in Pfeiffer as follows: <o:p></o:p></div>
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<i>‘…when the
national court is seised of a dispute concerning the application of domestic
provisions which, as here, have been specifically enacted for the purpose of
transposing a directive<o:p></o:p></i></div>
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<i>intended to
confer rights on individuals. The national court must … presume that the<o:p></o:p></i></div>
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<i>Member
State, following its exercise of the discretion afforded it under that
provision,<o:p></o:p></i></div>
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<i>had the
intention of fulfilling entirely the obligations arising from the directive concerned.’</i><o:p></o:p></div>
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<i>Pfeiffer’s</i>
rule does no more than presume that a member state does not intend to flout its
EU treaty obligations, without at least expressing this in clear and
unequivocal terms, raises the bar considerably for any finding that a
conforming interpretation is c<i>ontra proferentem</i> (i.e. goes against the grain of
Parliament's legislative intentions)<o:p></o:p></div>
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Had the
Justices complied with <i>Pfeiffer</i>, as they are obliged under the primacy of EU
law to do, then they would have found that this mandatory presumption raises the
bar considerably to establishing the c<i>ontra proferentem</i> exception that it
relied on in its deliberations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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I also
express a second concern that in considering what is meant by Article 3 of the Motor
Insurance Directive (2009/103/EC) by ‘use of a vehicle’ it did so in apparent ignorance
of two recent rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The first of
these was delivered by the Grand Chamber and is highly authoritative: <i>Fundo de
Garantia Automóvel v Juliana</i> (Case C 80-17) [2018]; the second being <i>BTA Baltic
Insurance Company’ AS v Baltijas Apdrošinašanas Nams</i> (Case C 648/17) [2018].<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is abundantly clear that Article 3’s
insurance requirement carries a much wider scope for the types of use requiring
insurance than the UK’s common law authorities allow for.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This much is evident from the following excerpt
from Juliana: <o:p></o:p></div>
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<i>‘41<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Therefore,
the fact that the Court held, in essence, in the judgments mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, that only situations of use of the insured vehicle which
fall within the use of a vehicle as a means of transport and, therefore, fall
within the concept of ‘use of vehicles’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of
the First Directive or of the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive
2009/103, may give rise to the insurer being responsible, under a contract of
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of that vehicle, for
the damage or injuries caused by the latter, does not in any way mean that the
determination of whether there is an obligation to take out such insurance
should be dependent on whether or not the vehicle at issue is actually being
used as a means of transport at a given time.<o:p></o:p></i></div>
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<i>42<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In the light
of the foregoing, it must be held that a vehicle which is registered and
therefore has not been officially withdrawn from use, and which is capable of
being driven, corresponds to the concept of ‘vehicle’ within the meaning of
Article 1(1) of the First Directive and, consequently, does not cease to be
subject to the insurance obligation laid down in Article 3(1) of that
directive, on the sole ground that its owner no longer intends to drive it and
immobilises it on private land.’</i><o:p></o:p></div>
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A third concern I have with the Supreme Court’s ruling is
that it failed to refer this issue, as to what is meant by ‘use of a vehicle’
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. As a court of
final appeal, it was the Justices non-discretionary treaty bound duty to do so.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In the second and final instalment of my commentary on
<i>Pilling</i> I explain why the three step approach adopted by the court for construing
motor policy terms is based on a logical fallacy. <o:p></o:p></div>
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This is the second time in as many months that the Supreme
Court has signally failed to apply the rule of law and to deliver justice to
the parties in this context.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>See my
critique of the Supreme Court’s ruling in <span style="color: blue;"><a href="http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.com/2019/03/the-supreme-court-ruling-in-cameron.html" target="_blank">Cameron v Liverpool & Victoria Insurance [2019] UKSC 6</a>.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-15595464755819918972019-05-20T10:40:00.000+01:002019-05-20T10:42:47.067+01:00PILLING v UK INSURANCE [2019] UKSC 16 <br />
<h2>
Phoenix in flames: lessons from <i>Pilling</i></h2>
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<h3>
R & S Pilling t/a Phoenix Engineering v UK Insurance Ltd
[2019] UKSC 16 </h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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The first installment of my mini-series on the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Pilling </i>is published in this week's edition of the New Law Journal (17th May 2019). I examine the court's approach to the consistent construction of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and find it wanting.<br />
<br />
See <a href="https://nicholasbevan.blogspot.com/2019/05/pilling-v-uk-insurance-2019-another.html" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;">my earlier post</span></a> on this ruling. </div>
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In next week's installment I consider the Supreme Court's approach to policy construction.Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-54453367607784196682019-05-19T18:23:00.003+01:002019-05-19T18:23:38.277+01:00IS THE MOTOR INSURERS BUREAU PROPERLY ACCOUNTABLE?<br />
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At APIL’s 2019 annual conference I attended Dominic
Clayden’s update on the latest developments within the Motor Insurance Bureau
and the new IT platform it is developing to handle personal injury claims by
unrepresented members of the public. <o:p></o:p></div>
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After hearing the Motor Insurers Bureau’s new CEO declare
that the MIB was the Ministry of Justice’s delivery partner for developing the
new portal and on viewing his impressive powerpoint organisational schema that
reveals the impressive range and variety of different public services it
discharges on behalf of the government, I expressed puzzlement that the MIB still
denies its status as an emanation of the state in the ongoing appeal in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Lewis v Tindale & MIB</i>.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The appeal was heard last week.<o:p></o:p></div>
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I suggested that the MIB has become a mini-ministry
responsible for a significant proportion of the Department for Transport and Ministry
of Justice’s responsibilities imposed under the European Motor Insurance
Directives. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I invited him to consider
reforming the constitution of this motor insurer consortium, given its
important public service role.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I
suggested that it should co-opt onto its board certain special interest groups,
such as RoadPeace, and to make the organisation more open and accountable to
the general public, who fund its operations through their insurance premiums.<o:p></o:p></div>
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I was not surprised that Dominic Clayden should reject my
suggestion out of hand.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, I was
surprised by the lame excuse he gave.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He
claimed that its governance was its own private concern and that if claimants
choose to use its services or not then that was a matter of choice for
them.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is as obviously wrong as it
is disingenuous.<o:p></o:p></div>
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One may choose to go shopping to one of several stores;
claimants do not choose to be injured by another’s negligence, nor does the
invocation of their legal entitlement to compensation by the only legally recognised
route to redress amount to a question of choice; it is a matter of compulsion; not free
choice.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-13597028443602873512019-05-19T17:42:00.002+01:002019-05-20T09:59:22.834+01:00APIL Conference<br />
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Last week I attended the annual conference of the
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, of which I am a senior fellow.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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It was a pleasure to join the panel to discuss ‘The Impact
of Brexit’ with Katherine Deal QC of 3 Hare Court; Sarah Crowther QC of Outer
Temple Chambers; Chris Deacon from Stewarts solicitors; Simon Davis, vice
president of the Law Society, and Dominic Clayden the new CEO at the Motor
Insurers’ Bureau.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Prior to this, Dominic Clayden presented an update on the
latest developments within the MIB and the new IT platform it is developing to
deal with personal injury claims by unrepresented members of the public.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>He revealed that the insurance industry is
investing £15m in this new online portal.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span>This online claims platform will be linked to a call centre.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Although much is still unknown about its precise workings,
the MIB has a target of April 2020 for the system to go live.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The new portal’s launch is intended to coincide
with the implementation of new reduced scale tariffs on the damages paid for soft
tissue injuries sustained in road traffic accident claims, under the Civil
Liability Act 2018. It is also intended to facilitate claims by litigants in
person once the government’s extends the scope of the small claims track for
motor claims valued up to £5,000, also planned for April 2020. <o:p></o:p></div>
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This new portal and these reforms will effectively remove,
on some estimates, at least half of the present volume of road traffic accident
claims from the current portal where solicitor’s receive modest levels of fixed
costs from the insurers of an at-fault party. This will effectively divert a
substantial quantity of routine low value civil liability litigation from solicitors
practices.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Many view this as the final
turn of the screw for the bulk personal injury claims sector that began with
the civil justice reforms in 2013.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Listening in to a seminar that updated the membership on the
progress being made on developing the new claims portal, I was reminded of the
scene from Monty Python’s ‘Life of Brian’ where Michael Palin, solicitously instructs
each participant: ‘Straight out; line up on the left, one cross each…’<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-60318567412568505522019-05-15T09:46:00.002+01:002019-05-15T09:55:58.664+01:00LEWIS V TINDALE & MOTOR INSURERS BUREAU 2019<h2>
The appeal in Lewis v Tindale & MIB opens today in the Court of Appeal.</h2>
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Extract from today's cause list:</h3>
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THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS' COURT COURT 71<o:p></o:p></div>
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Before LORD JUSTICE HENDERSON<o:p></o:p></div>
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<span style="background: yellow; mso-highlight: yellow;">LORD
JUSTICE FLAUX</span> and <o:p></o:p></div>
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SIR STEPHEN RICHARDS<o:p></o:p></div>
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Wednesday, 15th May, 2019<o:p></o:p></div>
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At half-past 10<o:p></o:p></div>
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APPEAL <o:p></o:p></div>
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From The Queen's Bench Division<o:p></o:p></div>
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FINAL DECISIONS<o:p></o:p></div>
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B3/2018/2411 Michael Lewis (a protected party by his
Litigation Friend Janet Lewis) -v- Tindale and Ors. Appeal of Second Defendant
from the order of Mr Justice Soole, dated 14th September 2018, filed 5th
October 2018.<o:p></o:p></div>
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This appeal will be livestreamed live via the Courts and
Tribunals Judiciary website.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>For more
information and to view the hearing please click the link below.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCvLfIeTq5grIEkc7JvOpoxg/live"><span style="color: blue;">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCvLfIeTq5grIEkc7JvOpoxg/live</span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iehb5hUKNZs/XNvOdL7PKgI/AAAAAAAABc4/iaPnd15Mu7Y_GrYP74rRFbe7yQ1bb-zTwCLcBGAs/s1600/Flaux.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="423" data-original-width="306" height="200" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iehb5hUKNZs/XNvOdL7PKgI/AAAAAAAABc4/iaPnd15Mu7Y_GrYP74rRFbe7yQ1bb-zTwCLcBGAs/s200/Flaux.jpg" width="144" /></a></div>
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<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">This appeal is likely to engender a sense of<i> deja vu</i> in Lord Justice Flaux. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">Twelve years ago, in <i>Byrne v MIB & Secretary of State for Transport </i> [2007] EWHC 1278 (QB), Flaux J (as he was then) found that the MIB was not an emanation of the state and this led him to conclude that it was not bound by the direct effect, under EU law, of the provisions of the Motor Insurance Directives.</span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">My independent research, first published in 2012, revealed that the learned judge was not only misinformed on the legal test for establishing state liability but he was also misled about the true nature and status of the MIB and its close working relationship with the Department for Transport as well as to the degree of control exercised by the latter over the MIB's compensatory role. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">It should not be forgotten that Flaux J’s judgment delivered justice to the claimant. He found that the MIB’s strict three year time limit for applying to the MIB under the scheme for untraced drivers had been unlawfully applied against a child. His <i>Francovich</i> award against the minister was later upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2008] (EWCA Civ 574), and unanimously so, it was not necessary to revisit his findings on direct effect.</span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">My critique of the <i>Byrne</i> ruling is set out in my New Law Journal article: <b>Putting wrongs to rights (Part 2)</b>, from 3 June 2016. </span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">The case is even stronger now, after the Court of Justice's ruling in<i> Farrell v Whitty</i> (no. 2) [2017] </span></span><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Hlk495939324"><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt;">Case
C</span><span style="font-family: "cambria math" , serif; font-size: 11.0pt;">‑</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt;">413/15,</span></a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">fixed the Irish MIB with the state’s liability (‘vicariously’ so to speak): to provide redress for motor accident victims who ought (under EU law) to benefit from the compensatory guarantee mandated by the Motor Insurance Directives but who are not - due to the Irish government’s failure to fully implement that law within the Road Traffic Act 1961. </span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">The Irish MIB was incepted and is governed under almost identical principles to the MIB in the UK. There are numerous disparities between the minimum standard of compensatory protection mandated by the European Motor Insurance Directives and the UK's implementation of that law within Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988.</span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"><br /></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">This ruling had a profound influence in the first instance decision in <i>Lewis</i>. </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">The implications of Soole J's decision being upheld in this appeal will be profound.</span><br />
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For my analysis on the implications of Farrell (no. 2) see my mini-series of articles in the New Law Journal: <b>State liability: betwixt & between Brexit (Parts 1 & 2), </b>27 October and 3 November 2017</div>
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<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-apM1Z6SbSRs/XNvQV7w_jFI/AAAAAAAABdI/pMRhqQtDpMswPvVAZ1dF4hdZpWPrFV4TACLcBGAs/s1600/State%2Bliability.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="798" data-original-width="630" height="640" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-apM1Z6SbSRs/XNvQV7w_jFI/AAAAAAAABdI/pMRhqQtDpMswPvVAZ1dF4hdZpWPrFV4TACLcBGAs/s640/State%2Bliability.JPG" width="504" /></a></div>
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Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-79961203006011787642019-05-09T14:51:00.002+01:002019-05-09T15:04:07.451+01:00NEW WEBINAR: WINNING THE UNWINNABLE MOTOR CLAIM<h2>
LEWIS V TINDALE AND THE MOTOR INSURERS' BUREAU 2019</h2>
<div>
The MIB's appeal against the landmark first instance decision in <i><b>Lewis v Tindale & MIB</b></i> is listed for a 1.5 day trial in the Court of Appeal in mid May this year.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The Court of Appeal's decision will be something of a moment of truth for me as the first instance decision was largely based on my earlier research. See my earlier posts and my New Law Journal articles, over several years, that have advocated for the MIB's liability to compensate victims falling through the gaps left by the government's longstanding failure to implement the EU Directive 209/103/EC on motor insurance properly.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h3>
FORTHCOMING WEBINAR ON LEWIS V TINDALE AND MIB (and more) 19 June 2019.</h3>
<div>
The webinar will consider the Court of Appeal's judgment and, if time, it will also explain why two recent Supreme Court rulings are badly flawed and what remedies are available.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
See <a href="https://drive.google.com/open?id=1HKglhDOTwkTu6XIwD3D3nY570HbPP_NT" target="_blank">Lewis v Tindale Court of Appeal ruling</a> for details:</div>
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<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-wQrzryNcQQ8/XNQvWlm73BI/AAAAAAAABco/un1mR1ZLNuw2kh65uiWvObpkj5DaK4h3QCLcBGAs/s1600/flyer%2Bimage.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="894" data-original-width="625" height="640" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-wQrzryNcQQ8/XNQvWlm73BI/AAAAAAAABco/un1mR1ZLNuw2kh65uiWvObpkj5DaK4h3QCLcBGAs/s640/flyer%2Bimage.JPG" width="444" /></a></div>
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Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-49183464820265128342019-05-09T14:24:00.004+01:002019-05-20T10:45:13.130+01:00PILLING V UK INSURANCE 2019 - ANOTHER MISRULING <h2>
R & S Pilling t/a Phoenix Engineering v UK Insurance Ltd
[2019] UKSC 16 </h2>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<h4>
This is the second time in as many months that five justices
of the UK Supreme Court have misdirected themselves on European law and reached
a decision based on a line of reasoning that fails to withstand close
scrutiny. </h4>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
See <a href="https://nicholasbevan.blogspot.com/2019/03/the-supreme-court-ruling-in-cameron.html" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;">my earlier blog on <i>Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance</i></span></a> [2019] UKSC 6 and my New Law Journal feature
from 15 March 2019.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p> </o:p> </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The <i>Pilling </i>case featured a a dispute between a motor insurer
and a public liability insurer as to who was liable to indemnify the owners of
business premises for an extensive fire.
The conflagration was caused by an attempted DIY welding repair to an
employee's privately owned car. This set his car ablaze. The fire then spread; gutting the employer's
business premises. The key issues were:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p> </o:p> </div>
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</div>
<ul>
<li>whether a repair undertaken to return a car to immediate
road-use after it had failed its MOT was a 'use of a vehicle' that is required
by law to be covered by compulsory third party motor insurance. </li>
</ul>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
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<ul>
<li>whether UKI's motor policy that certified that it conformed with the UK law insurance requirement, and which was ambiguously worded,
should be construed to confer such cover.</li>
</ul>
<o:p></o:p><br />
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p> </o:p> </div>
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The Court of Appeal held that the motor insurer
was liable indemnify the claim but the Supreme Court disagreed; unanimously.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court misapplied the EU
law that governs how national courts should set about construing UK
implementing law, in its approach to interpreting the wording of the Road
Traffic Act 1988. This Act regulates
compulsory third-party motor insurance in the UK and it is supposed to fully
implement EU Directive 2009/103/EC on motor insurance. The Supreme Court also
failed to consider two recent and highly relevant (and binding) Court of
Justice rulings on ‘use of vehicles’ or to note that there is also an ongoing
reference to the Court of Justice on a similar point.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
On the second issue, the rationale for the three step approach devised by the Supreme Court to policy
construction is badly flawed.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The first instalment of my two part feature criticising this
decision is due to be published in the New Law Journal next week. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
The <i>Pilling </i>ruling also has a wider significance. It provides a useful insight into how ‘EU-derived
domestic legislation’ is likely to be interpreted by our courts under the EU
Withdrawal Act 2018.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-10549894063598189472019-03-15T16:41:00.002+00:002019-03-20T08:56:01.923+00:00THE SUPREME COURT RUING IN CAMERON V LIVERPOOL IS UNJUST<h2>
<i>Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance</i> [2019] UKSC 6</h2>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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In <i>Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance</i> the Supreme Court upheld an
appeal by a motor insurer (supported by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau as an
intervening party) against a Court of Appeal ruling that allowed a personal injury claim to proceed against an unidentified and untraced driver.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In a majority decision, the Court of Appeal permitted
Ms Cameron's claim (originally against the registered keeper of the vehicle) to be amended to substitute
the keeper, as first defendant, with the unidentified driver responsible for
causing the accident.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Permission was
also given for the unnamed driver to be identified in the proceedings by a description
of the vehicle driven and the accident date, place and time.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The court had also ordered alternative service of
the amended proceedings on the vehicle’s insurer and gave judgment against the
unnamed driver; noting that the insurer would settle the outstanding judgment.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The Supreme Court based its unanimous decision primarily on time honoured natural justice considerations that require a party to be served with proceedings which enable a party at least the opportunity of being heard by the court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It ruled that as alternative service on the
insurer was unlikely to come <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>to the
defendant’s attention, the claim could not proceed as a civil action.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
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The justices opined that the claimant’s
proper course should have been to apply to the compensatory scheme managed by
the Motor Insurers’ Bureau under the terms of the Untraced Drivers Agreement
2003.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This ruling restores a long-established practice that
predates the UK’s accession to the European Community whereby all untraced
driver claims are processed under the MIB’s Untraced Drivers Agreement schemes.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Unfair</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In my latest New Law Journal feature, I explain why the
Supreme Court’s decision fails on its own terms.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>I argue that even if one disregards the crucial EU law considerations, the natural
justice implications of the court’s decision, on whether to exercise its discretion to authorise the
amendment and to permit or waive service of the proceedings, fall heavily in the
claimant’s favour.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
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<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I contend that the evidence
shows that Ms Cameron was the innocent victim of a ‘hit and run’ driver who,
after colliding with her car (with enough force to write it off and injure her)
then went on to hit a second vehicle, before fleeing the scene.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>\I argue that it is inconceivable that the driver was
ignorant of the fact that he had at the very least caused some actionable
damage.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is equally implausible to
assume that he would not have been aware that had he stopped, he would have
been identified and later face a civil action. Therefore, it seems likely
(highly probable even) that his act of making-off was intended to evade civil
proceedings that could then be readily anticipated (as well as the possibility
of criminal proceedings: either for the careless driving or for driving whilst
uninsured).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court thought differently.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h3>
Wrong in law</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Leaving to one side these natural justice considerations, I believe
that the Supreme Court’s ruling is fundamentally flawed because the learned justices misinformed themselves about the relevant law.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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For example:<o:p></o:p></div>
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<ul>
<li>At para 5 of the judgment it states in robust terms that
there is no direct right of action against insurers for the underlying
liability of its assured under the UK compulsory insurance regime, when setting
the scene for the exercise of its discretion (on whether, in a civil action, a
court should order alternative service or to dispense with service entirely
against an unidentified driver). The Supreme Court overlooks the fact that EC
Rights Against Insurers Regs 2002 provides just such a remedy. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>At paras 4, 5 and 27, the court effectively asserts that the
allocation of claims to the MIB against unidentified drivers of identified and
insured vehicles is consistent with the Motor Insurance Directive
2009/103/EC.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is
wrong. It ignores no less than three CJEU rulings (<i>Churchill</i>, <i>Csonka </i>and <i>Fidelidade</i>) (see my earlier posts) that explicitly prohibit such claims from being allocated to
the compensating body (which in the UK this is the Motor Insurance Bureau) –
where a policy of insurance is in place for an identified vehicle.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is because the protective purpose of the
Directive requires the compensatory provision to be made by the insurer
direct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></li>
</ul>
<div>
Given that the MIB had no legal entitlement or authority to handle these claims under directly applicable EU law, Ms Cameron has been unjustly denied her entitlement by the Supreme Court justices.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I cannot think of another Supreme Court ruling that has got the basic
applicable law so badly wrong.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">My three-page New Law Journal feature is published in the 15 March 2019 edition, in the Insurance Legal Update section.</span></div>
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<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"><br /></span></div>
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<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-68927490109127108952019-02-04T12:42:00.001+00:002019-02-04T12:44:15.372+00:00Answer to Consultation Question 40<h2 style="line-height: 107%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b><span style="color: #004d7e;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles</span></b></h2>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<h2 style="line-height: 108%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-outline-level: 3; mso-pagination: widow-orphan lines-together; page-break-after: avoid; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 40 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
9.6 - 9.37)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 110%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 31.2pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on whether it would be acceptable for
a highly automated vehicle to be programmed never to mount the pavement. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 17.12px; margin-bottom: 0.2pt;">
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US"> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">One of the main benefits of advanced automation is its promise of
improved independent access to private transport for the elderly and the
handicapped and cheap door to door delivery of goods.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 107%; margin-bottom: .2pt;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">By shoehorning this new statutory form of product liability into the
Road Traffic Act’s archaic and limited scope, both in terms of its geographic
reach and the types of vehicles covered by s2’s new direct liability, the
government has needlessly exposed children and other vulnerable individuals
from the protection of the compulsory insurance regime.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is hard to identify any coherent public
policy objective that is served by this anomaly. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>As indicated above, unless ADS are prohibited
on private property (which is clearly undesirable), the current geographic
restriction to roads and public places not only breaches EU law (Article 3 of
Directive 2009/103/EC on motor insurance) but it also lacks vision as pavements
and private places are likely to feature as points of embarkation or
destination in many journeys featuring ADS.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="color: blue;">Should highly automated vehicles ever exceed speed limits? </span><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
<b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US"> </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US">No comment</span>Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-24273772423341053882019-02-04T12:31:00.000+00:002019-02-04T12:32:14.142+00:00Answers to Consultation Questions 8 - 15<h2 style="line-height: 107%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b><i><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles </span></i></b></h2>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<h2>
<span lang="EN-US">Consultation Question 8 (Paragraphs 4.102 - 4.104) </span></h2>
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<span style="color: blue;">Do you agree that: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(1)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->a new safety assurance scheme should be established to authorise
automated driving systems which are installed:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(a)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>as modifications to registered vehicles; or <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(b)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";"> </span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>in vehicles manufactured in limited numbers (a
"small series")?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(2)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->unauthorised automated driving systems should be prohibited? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(3)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->the safety assurance agency should also have powers to make special
vehicle orders for highly automated vehicles, so as to authorise design changes
which would otherwise breach construction and use regulations? </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yes to all.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 9 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
4.107 - 4.109)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">Do you agree that every automated driving system
(ADS) should be backed by an entity (ADSE) which takes responsibility for the
safety of the system? </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yes<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 10 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
4.112 - 4.117)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on how far should a new safety
assurance system be based on accrediting the developers’ own systems, and how
far should it involve third party testing. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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No comment</div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 11 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
4.118 - 4.122)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on how the safety assurance scheme
could best work with local agencies to ensure that is sensitive to local
conditions. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">No comment<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><u style="text-underline: #004D7E;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">CHAPTER 5: REGULATING
SAFETY ON THE ROADS</span></u></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">A new organisational structure? </i></span></b><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 12 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
5.30 - 5.32)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">If there is to be a new safety assurance scheme to
authorise automated driving systems before they are allowed onto the roads,
should the agency also have responsibilities for safety of these systems following
deployment? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">If so, should the organisation have
responsibilities for:<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(1)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->regulating consumer and marketing materials?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(2)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->market surveillance? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: blue;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(3)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span><!--[endif]-->roadworthiness tests? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on whether the agency’s
responsibilities in these three areas should extend to advanced driver
assistance systems. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yes and much more (and this should be addressed as a matter of considerable urgency) given what is said at paragraph 3.12 of the LC report. </span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">I am awaiting a Freedom of Information Act request on the number of Tesla Model S currently on our roads. Some online sources indicate that this could be in excess of 2,000. Tesla plans to launch its new mid range Model 3 into the UK market this year, presumably in greater numbers.See my concerns about the danger posed by driver assist technology in my response to Q7.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<br /></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Driver training </span></i></b><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 13 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
5.54 - 5.55)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Is there a need to provide drivers with additional
training on advanced driver assistance systems?<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">If so, can this be met on a voluntary basis,
through incentives offered by insurers? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">No.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Guidance should
continue to be provided by the government within the Highway Code.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>This is
a responsibility that should be delegated to commercial interests.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> The Highway Code needs to be updated to accommodate the skills and standards appropriate to this new technology. </span>Every </span>driver skill, standard or theory that is safety critical should be incorporated within the driving test syllabus be subject to mandatory testing. It may be necessary to issue new vehicle categories for the driving licence.</div>
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<br /></div>
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A failure to address this urgent need to educate, test and licence emerging levels of automation as well as advanced automation would not
only be anomalous but it would compromise public safety.</div>
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<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span></span></i><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></b><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Accident investigation </span></i></b><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 14 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
5.58 - 5.71)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">We seek views on how accidents involving driving
automation should be investigated.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>We
seek views on whether an Accident Investigation Branch should investigate high
profile accidents involving automated vehicles? Alternatively, should
specialist expertise be provided to police forces. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">This is not my field of expertise but my experience of local police
forces is that their standard of investigation is variable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">A national government agency should be incepted, possibly along similar lines tothe
Air Accidents Investigation Branch.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
single authoritative national agency would be best placed to apply a consistent
approach to the same standard.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>A
national body is needed to develop a strategic view as well as a specialist
knowledge in ADS, motor engineering, data recording and collection et cetera.
This might be a suitable role for a dedicated sub-division of the proposed
Safety Assurance Agency. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">It might be sensible to restrict the agency's involvement to serious accidents involving an injury where a police report has confirmed that an automated vehicle was present at the scene of the accident. It would probably be necessary to impose a strict time limit to ensure prompt notification, if the accident data is to be preserved.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 107%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Setting and monitoring a safety standard </span></i></b><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 108%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-outline-level: 3; mso-pagination: widow-orphan lines-together; page-break-after: avoid; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 15 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
5.78 - 5.85)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 110%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 62.4pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(1)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Do you agree that the new safety agency should monitor the accident rate
of highly automated vehicles which drive themselves, compared with human
drivers? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 110%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 62.4pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-align: justify; text-indent: 0cm;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">(2)<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="color: black; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">We seek views on whether there is also a need to monitor the accident
rates of advanced driver assistance systems. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 107%; margin-bottom: .2pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yes to both (1) and (2).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-5595822975682051912019-02-03T17:41:00.001+00:002019-02-04T11:52:26.350+00:00Answer to Consultation Question 18<br />
<h2 style="line-height: 108%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-outline-level: 3; mso-pagination: widow-orphan lines-together; page-break-after: avoid; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles</span></i></b></h2>
<h2 style="line-height: 108%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-outline-level: 3; mso-pagination: widow-orphan lines-together; page-break-after: avoid; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Civil liability of manufacturers and retailers:
Implications</span></i></b></h2>
<h2 style="line-height: 108%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: -.25pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; mso-outline-level: 3; mso-pagination: widow-orphan lines-together; page-break-after: avoid; text-indent: -.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><br /> </span></i></b><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Consultation
Question 18 </span></b><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">(Paragraphs
6.61 - 6.116)<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"> <o:p></o:p></b></span></h2>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 110%; margin-bottom: 6.0pt; margin-left: 31.2pt; margin-right: 0cm; margin-top: 0cm; text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: blue;">Is there a need to review the way in which product
liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 applies to defective software
installed into automated vehicles? </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<h3 style="line-height: 107%; margin-bottom: .2pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span lang="EN-US" style="color: #538135; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-themecolor: accent6; mso-themeshade: 191;">Draft Answer:</span></b><span lang="EN-US" style="color: black; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">
</span><o:p></o:p></span></h3>
<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yes.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Preliminary note on
the question’s scope</span></b></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">I infer from the Law Commission’s limited terms of reference, that this
question is primarily concerned with secondary claims brought by motor insurers
under s5 AEVA 2108; not the primary accident victims whom the entire edifice of
Part VI Road Traffic Act 1988 and S2 AEVA 2018 is supposed to benefit.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>In which case, strictly speaking this question
only concerns those vehicles likely to be listed under s1, i.e. high or full
automation – (see LCCR 240 para 2.55 and footnote 83). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Yet the Law Commission expressly concedes the need to widen the scope of
its consultation (see para 1.14) and this much is clear from some of its
questions, such as Q6, 7,8 and 12. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The Consumer
Protection Act 1987’s - fitness for purpose for insurers</span></b></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The Consumer Protection Act 1987 (CPA) fully implements the Directive
85/374/EEC on Product Liability and can be easily revised after Brexit should
need arise. Two important concerns, raised in para 3.9 of the Government
Response to its consultation on Advanced Driver Assistance Systems and
Automated, from January 2017, are that this legislation might be inadequate for
insurers wishing to invoke their statutory right of recoupment, because (i) product
liability is optional, and (ii) no statutory minimum amount of cover is
set.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Against that, it should be
acknowledged that motor insurers are in an advantageous commercial position to
limit their exposure to risk by negotiating effective reimbursement guarantees from
manufacturers and suppliers, in return for offering competitive (and from the
ultimate consumer’s perspective, affordable) premiums. Manufacturers who fail
to incept a Volvo style compensatory guarantee are likely to find that the cost
of insuring their vehicles might make their products unattractive to consumers.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Problems will nevertheless arise where
causation is disputed or needs to be apportioned.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>However, the motor insurance industry is best
placed to confront these challenges as it has the necessary expertise and
resources as well as a strategic overview that few private individuals could hope
to command.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is conceivable that the
MIB could co-ordinate collective actions against manufacturers and or develop a
specialist expertise in these claims, as opposed to individual insurers. The
government should ensure that its regulation of motor insurers ensures that the
industry has taken all appropriate measures to safeguard it exposure to insolvency
and to guarantee that victims recover their full compensatory entitlement. This
is not something that can safely be left to the industry to self-regulate with
complete autonomy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The Consumer
Protection Act 1987’s - fitness for purpose for individual claimants</span></b></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">If the strict liability provisions of s2 are to be confined to highly
and fully automated vehicles then this discriminates against victims of what
are arguably even more dangerous forms of automation that are already on our
roads or which will shortly be introduced (SAE L2 & 3 automation).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The UK’s adversarial civil justice system, whilst striving to ensure
fairness and to put individual parties on an equal footing on a case by case
basis, has serious shortcomings when it comes to an unequal contest between
private individuals and international corporations.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Fixed recoverable costs and the
proportionality rule shift the tactical advantage heavily to the advantage of a
corporate opponent who can afford to adopt untenable or unreasonable stances in
individual cases if it serves its wider commercial interests.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Private individuals generally do not have the
same expertise and usuallyt nothing approaching a parity of resources.
Accidents caused by existing and close to market levels of vehicle automation
(SAE L2 & 3) are likely to prove to be fiendishly technical, time-consuming
and costly. Modest value claims are likely to be disproportionately expensive
to investigate, let alone litigate, and so many will be uneconomic to pursue. The
effective abolition of public funding in this area exacerbates these inequalities.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The limited scope of the strict liability provisions of the 1987 Act is unlikely
to assist victims in many of these cases. I consider some of its deficiencies
in my New Law Journal article, Driverless Vehicles: a future perfect? (Part 2)
30 November 2018.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>These include:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The imprecision and subjectivity of the definition of ‘defect’ , based
as it is on the reasonable expectations of the public at large test is too
nebulous a measure and subject to change. Accidents contributed or caused by
semi-automated / transitional stages of automation will attract great public
interest in the media, which risks lowering the public’s expectations in this
regard;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The exclusion of wear and tear;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The continuing uncertainty as whether all types of software are covered;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The ability of manufacturers to issue lengthy disculpatory warnings in
their manuals and literature, in the full knowledge that it is likely to be
ignored by some (if not many) consumers;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The relative ease with which a manufacturer like Tesla will be able to
deploy the s4(e) defence that applies to cutting edge technology;<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The government’s failure to regulate mandatory PL cover and minimum
levels of liability<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -18.0pt;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><span style="font-family: "symbol"; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-font-family: Symbol; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><span style="mso-list: Ignore;">·<span style="font: 7.0pt "Times New Roman";">
</span></span></span><!--[endif]--><span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">The ten year long stop limitation.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Furthermore, in addition to the inadequacies of this legislation, an
individual claimant who is unable to establish strict liability under the 1987
Act will be faced with a forbidding evidentiary burden in establishing what was
the true cause of the accident.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is
conceivable that one of many individual component manufacturers would be
responsible for a systems failure.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>It is
equally conceivable that the software was susceptible to hacking by a malicious
third party or that the cause of accident was contributed to the driver / user’s
negligence . These are all unknowns (i.e. litigation risk) that undermine legal
certainty and the prospect of an accident victims recovering his or her proper
compensatory entitlement.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">With all due respect, the inequality in access to justice that pervades
the UK’s civil justice system <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>is not something
that any responsible government should ignore. Nor should it overlook the fact
that by licencing these evolving levels of automation for use on roads it has
actual or at least constructive knowledge of the correlative risks associated
with their deployment. The government has a moral obligation to ensure not only
that the vehicles it licences are fit for their intended use but also that
victims are fairly treated and fully compensated if and when something goes wrong.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The present artificial dichotomy been advanced
automated vehicles at SAE Ls4 & 5 and all other forms of automation lacks moral
coherence or other justification.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">It is perhaps appropriate to note the government’s longstanding failure
to fully implement Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC which requires any
compulsory motor insurance for <u>any</u> civil liability (not just the
personal fault of the user / owner / insured) and which extends to a much wider
class of vehicle as well as private premises.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Urgent steps need to be taken to safeguard the interests of accident victims
(which need to be given at least the same attention as the insurance industry).<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The most obvious solutions would be either to
reform the CPA 1987 or to bring driver assist and conditional automation into
the scope of the strict liability provisions of the AEVA 2018.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-18061517836433008692019-02-03T17:39:00.000+00:002019-02-04T11:52:46.951+00:00Answer to Q 17 on the need for a further review of civil iability<h2 style="break-after: avoid; line-height: 25.92px; margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt -0.25pt; text-indent: -0.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles</span></i></b></h2>
<b><br /></b>
<b>CHAPTER 6: CIVIL LIABILITY </b><br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>Is there a need for further review? </b><br />
<br />
<h2>
Consultation Question 17 (Paragraphs 6.13 - 6.59) </h2>
<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on whether there is a need for further guidance or clarification on Part 1 of Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 in the following areas: </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(1)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Are sections 3(1) and 6(3) on contributory negligence sufficiently clear? </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(2)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Do you agree that the issue of causation can be left to the courts, or is there a need for guidance on the meaning of causation in section 2? </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(3)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Do any potential problems arise from the need to retain data to deal with insurance claims? If so: </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(a)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>to make a claim against an automated vehicle’s insurer, should the injured person be required to notify the police or the insurer about the alleged incident within a set period, so that data can be preserved? </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(b)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>how long should that period be? </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;"><br /></span>
<br />
<h3>
Answer: </h3>
<br />
<h4>
(1) Contributory negligence</h4>
The product liability provisions within Part 1 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act has clear parallels to the Consumer Protection Act 1978. Both make provision for strict liability and then confer the defendant’s entitlement to raise a defence of contributory negligence. However, although s 2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act provides for liability on the producer/supplier where any damage is “wholly or partly caused” by a defect, s 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act does not make it clear that the insurer will be liable for damage partly caused by the vehicle.<br />
<br />
S 2(1) of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act merely provides that where an accident is caused by an automated vehicle…the insurer is liable for that damage”.<br />
<br />
It appears to be the intention of the 2018 Act that the insurer should be liable if damage is partly caused by the vehicle, as section 8(3) provides that “a reference to an accident caused by an automated vehicle includes a reference to an accident that is partly caused by an automated vehicle. Although this clarified in section 8(3), the different wording referred to above in s2(1) introduces an entirely unnecessary divergence that will probably need to be resolved by a court.<br />
<br />
I believe that there would be better legal certainty if section 2(1) provided that insurers are liable where damage is wholly or partly caused by the vehicle.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h4>
(2) Causation</h4>
When the courts consider the allocation of damages for contributory negligence, they must weigh up not only the causative contribution of the parties in terms of to what extent are the parties responsible for precipitating the accident but they must also taking into account the causative potency of the victim’s negligence. This was considered by (then) Lady Justice Hale in the case of Eagle v Chambers, and later unanimously approved by the Supreme Court in Jackson v Murray and others [2015] UKSC 15:<br />
‘It was noted by Hale LJ in Eagle that there were two aspects to apportioning liability between the claimant and defendant, namely the respective causative potency of what they had done, and their respective blameworthiness…The court had consistently imposed a high burden upon the drivers of cars, to reflect the potentially dangerous nature of driving. ‘<br />
In relation to automated vehicles, the causative potency of the manufacturer or producer’s culpability ought to take into account the fact that by making and / or marketing the product that they have introduced a potential hazard to the road using environment. A driverless car could be equated to a heavy guided missile. Consequently, its potential to cause harm or the likelihood of the harm being high is obviously significant. In which case it is appropriate that the causative potency for any manufacturing or software defect should reflect this moral responsibility. The same could be said of the known effects of automation on a human driver, which are said to be detrimental on their level of attention and the appropriateness / effectiveness of any reaction.<br />
<br />
<h4>
(3) Retention of data</h4>
<br />
Ideally, relevant data should be preserved and disclosed. The practical considerations of implementing this is a technical issue that I am unable to comment on in any detail or authority. However, it stands to reason that data storage, presumably from multiple sensors, is likely to involve large quantities of memory and so the ability of automated vehicles to store a long operational history is likely to be limited.<br />
<br />
Accident's should be reported to the AVSE within 24 hours and the relevant data uploaded to that destination within 72 hours. Consideration should be given to deciding whether it would be appropriate to impose a legal presumption following an unjustified or unexplained failure to upload or preserve this data.<br />
<br />
My personal experiences in practice of different Police forces around the country suggest their ability to administer accident recording and data retention either efficiently or consistently is limited. Perhaps this is a role that should be assigned to the AVSE.<br />
<br />
<h4>
(4) Other related issues</h4>
<br />
<b>What standard?</b><br />
It is unclear whether the standard of care for the automated system is that of a reasonably careful driver, a highly skilled driver, a reasonably proficient software or of perfection. Nowhere in the Act is this specified, and I do not believe that this should be left to the courts. Private individuals injured by AV would be required to endure potential ruinous appeal to clarify the law. The law should be clear and comprehensive from the outset, with no need to rely on the courts to make decisions on the interpretation of the Act.<br />
<br />
<b>Untraced Drivers Agreement 2017 and the Uninsured Drivers Agreement 2015</b><br />
The deficiencies alluded to at LCCR 240 para 6.18 et sequentia should be addressed immediately. Strict liability should attach to accidents caused by automated vehicles operating in driverless mode. The MIB has a history of obfuscation and delay and the government should take the initiative by dictating appropriate amendments to be agreed forthwith. Even with a Brexit, it would be sensible and possibly necessary to apply the continental principle of equivalence here.<br />
<br />
<b>Is section 2(6) of the 2018 Act sufficiently precise?</b><br />
In ordinary motor insurance policy claims brought under s151 Road Traffic Act 1988, an insurer can apply under section 152 of the 1988 Act for the policy to be voided where the policy was induced through a fraud. Different tests apply, depending on whether the policy was a consumer or commercial contract. Where such an application succeeds in a voidance declaration, the policy is treated as though it never occurred. Strict liability under section 2 is premised on a policy being in force at the date of the accident.<br />
<br />
Although s 2(6) of the 2018 Act provides “Except as provided by section 4, liability under this section may not be limited or excluded by a term of an insurance policy or in any other way”, it is unclear whether the phrase “any other way” provides an absolute prohibition on insurers avoiding liability after a policy has been issued. It is unclear whether it precludes an insurer from applying under section 152 for a declaration that the policy is void ab initio.<br />
<br />
Incidentally, section 152(2) of the 1988 Act does not conform with EU law, see the CJEU ruling in Fidelidade Case C-287/16.<br />
<br />
This uncertainly present by this imprecision in s2(6) of the 2018 Act creates a risk that without clarification, insurers will argue that strict liability does not apply, because strict liability under the Act only applies if insurance is in place. In these circumstances, a court could easily conclude that (i) insurance was not in place because the policy holder deliberately misled the insurer, voiding the policy as if it never existed and (ii) that this does not contravene section 2(6). Insurers can and do regularly raise these defences to evade liability under s 151 of the 1988 Act. Although this is prohibited under European law, these rulings have not been implemented/followed, and so in the absence of any UK precedent, their influence is set to be lost on Brexit, along with the EU law doctrine of direct effect. As such, it is even more vital that there is clarification as to whether, under s2(6), insurers are precluded from applying under s 152 of the 1988 Act for a declaration that the policy is void, thus avoiding liability.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-62758309239076179802019-02-03T17:25:00.000+00:002019-02-04T17:24:24.478+00:00Answer to Consultation Qs 6 & 7<h2 style="break-after: avoid; line-height: 25.92px; margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt -0.25pt; text-indent: -0.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles</span></i></b></h2>
<h2>
Consultation Question 6 (Paragraphs 3.80 - 3.96) </h2>
<br />
<span style="color: blue;">Under what circumstances should a driver be permitted to undertake secondary activities when an automated driving system is engaged? </span><br />
<br />
<h3>
Answer: </h3>
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>I note that the refence to ‘driver’ in the context of a vehicle operating an ADS does not necessarily exclude highly and fully automated vehicles contemplated by s1 AEVA 2018 as even vehicles with full automation are likely to have a manual override option. Even so, I infer that this question is primarily intended to refer to vehicles whose dynamic driving task is controlled by ADS of existing and close to market levels of automation (i.e. driver assistance (SAE L2) and conditional automation (SAE L3)) because where a vehicle is driven under normal manual control, existing civil liability rules and safety standards (which prohibit distractions) would apply.<br />
<br />
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>There is no simple answer that allows for a one size fits all regulation.<br />
<br />
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The issue is a nuanced one that depends as much on the vehicle’s technical capacity as on its ODD (i.e. its operating environment/context of use); the appropriate international standards, such as the UNECE conventions (currently undergoing review), as well as the minister’s discretion under s1 AEVA 2018 (and / or any ADSE criteria).<br />
<br />
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>On a general point, there needs be a close and clear correlation between physical standards expected of a ‘driver’ and the level of sensory sophistication and processing capacity of vehicle automation.<br />
<br />
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The present general proscription on distractions should apply (modified only to permit viewing screens to undertake remote self-parking, listening to the radio etc) for all vehicles with ADS below SAE Level 4.<br />
<br />
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>It is important to emphasise that the government’s limited terms of reference set out at Appendix 1 appear to exclude the present and urgent need to regulate existing SAE L2 automation that is already on our roads (not to mention the SAE L3 automation that is close to market). It almost goes without saying that no distractions should be permitted where a driver is actively monitoring a vehicle running in a driver assist mode in a vehicle equipped with SAE L 2 automation. The driver’s attention should always be focused either on the road ahead or in undertaking peripheral road safety observations.<br />
•<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>A user-in-charge of a vehicle equipped with SAE level 4 (and possibly also SAE L5) should never be expected to intervene in the capacity of a ‘fallback driver’, - so secondary activities should generally be permitted to encourage a general state of alertness, except perhaps in certain relatively high-risk environments, such as locations shared by pedestrians. Where a user-in-charge is required, the individual must always remain conscious, sober and able to drive, even if full attention is diverted away from the DDT whilst the vehicle’s ADS is actively engaged.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h2>
Consultation Question 7 (Paragraphs 3.80 - 3.96) </h2>
<span style="color: blue;">Conditionally automated driving systems require a human driver to act as a fallback when the automated driving system is engaged. If such systems are authorised at an international level: </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(1)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>should the fallback be permitted to undertake other activities? </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;">(2)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>if so, what should those activities be? </span><br />
<br />
<h3>
Answer: </h3>
Much turns on what ‘a request to intervene’ involves see paras 2.09(4); 2.17) and the intrinsic reliability and responsiveness of the ADS: e.g. whether a safety critical intervention is needed in the face of an emergency or only as part of a more sedate handover.<br />
<br />
This question features close to market automation that the government has indicated is unlikely to be classed as an ‘automated vehicle’ within the meaning of sections 8 (1) and 1(4) of the AEVA 2018 by the minister. See LCCR 240 para 2.56 and footnote 83.<br />
<br />
Q 7 (1) Yes, as a basic proposition but one that is subject to certain qualifications. This qualified permissive approach reflects the following:<br />
First, that human intervention in this context [where the DDT is not being monitored actively] is unlikely to prove to be a reliability effective counter-measure for any ADS failure or other exigency that requires urgent or near instant human intervention. Fall back drivers are unlikely to be in a position to respond with sufficient speed to address a serious system failures in fast moving traffic on dual carriageways and motorways. Neither would a fall back driver be likely to be able to respond sufficiently promptly to a burst tyre or to correct loss of control caused an oil spillage at 50 or 60 mph on an A road. In both examples the human factors considered, at#3.7; #3.12; #3.85 and Appendix 3 apply. The point here being that secondary activities are unlikely to have a consistent causative effect on the safety of the driving.<br />
Second, that any ADS system that requires, for safety reasons, that a driver either actively supervise the vehicle’s dynamic driving task or requires a fallback driver to respond promptly to a system alert or some other unforeseen problem when operating in its ODD - ought properly to be classified as an SLA L2 vehicle. My suggestion is that the fallback driver’s intervention should never be depended on for safety critical interventions, for reasons already alluded to.<br />
Third, this level of automation is premised on a yet to be achieved level of technical sophistication and the ability, through software programming, that enables the safe operation of SAE L3 automation, in almost any context, without requiring an instant response by the fallback driver to intervene with a safety critical intervention. Conditional automation should only be licensed for use save in highly specific low risk ODDs.<br />
<br />
To elucidate further, approval of SLA L3 conditional automation should be made conditional on the following:<br />
(i) The first point incorporates the aforementioned concern, namely that the type approval of conditional automated vehicles must first be contingent on it being officially established that each variant of SLA L3 vehicle automation (ie. each model, class or type) is sufficiently safe and reliable for use when deployed within its operational design domain – independently of any human intervention, excepting the safe and preplanned engagement and disengagement of the ADS. I understand that this level of operational reliability has yet to be achieved for normal every-day road use.<br />
(ii) The safety of every vehicle model should be certified by an independent body (perhaps the ADSE agency proposed by the LC) applying internationally recognised criteria and this needs to be undertaken to an equivalent standard as in the aviation industry. Manufacturers should not be allowed to self-certify their products.<br />
(iii) Type approval should be restricted for use within specified low risk environments that comprise their operational design domain ODD. The ODD may factor in weather and other road conditions as well as road types and locations near playgrounds and school etc. I would envision the geographical ODD of SLA L3 vehicles will need to be restricted initially to dedicated lanes along non-pedestrianised routes where the risk to vulnerable road users (pedestrians or cyclists) is minimal or non-existent or at very low speeds along clearly designated routes (similar to tram lines) and be accompanied by audible and visual signaling to alert other road users that an ADS is engaged. Paradoxically, a vehicle ostensibly equipped with SAE L3 automation might be capable of qualifying as highly automated (at SAE L4 ) and / or of being listed under s1 AEVA 2018 as an automated vehicle that is subject to the direct right conferred by s2 of the Act if its ODD is so highly restricted that it is safe to operate without a fallback driver because no human intervention is required to meet a safety critical contingency.<br />
(iv) Each vehicle model should be hard-wired to prevent the ADS from operating outside its certified ODD and unless such use is lawful for that model and the change has been preplanned and authorised by the insurer. It should not be possible for the owner / user to override the vehicle’s ODD (outside any predetermined permissive parameters) without first obtaining authority through an officially sanctioned reclassification process.<br />
(v) Every journey where ADS is intended to be used should be preplanned / preprogrammed whilst the vehicle is stationary and the system connected to online traffic reports, safety-critical software updates and weather data: either before embarkation or at an en route parking point (where a change in destination can be programmed). This ADS should not otherwise engage. Clearly the ADS will need to have the capacity to alter its route, during a journey, in response to weather and traffic conditions, etc.<br />
(vi) All secondary activities should be banned or suspended (e.g. radio) in the moments leading up to the hand-over to human control as the vehicle approaches the end of its geographical ODD. This should be enforced by on board haptic and visual sensors and vehicle-use data that must be disclosed to the vehicle’s insurer. Inappropriate or illegal use could result in higher premiums.<br />
(vii) Section 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 should be amended to include these transitionary levels of automation (SAE L2 & 3), especially if it is decided that an SAE L3 fallback driver is needed to perform a safety critical intervention in an urgency. This is necessary because the Government has already indicated that the minister is unlikely to exercise his wide discretion under s1 AEVA so as to classify conditional automation as an ‘automated vehicle’ because it cannot achieve a minimal risk condition: see #2.56 and 3.25. This is unsatisfactory because this transitory level of technology (at SAE L3) seems to be inherently less safe and susceptible to misunderstandings as to its capability and reliability than the futuristic levels of automation envisioned by some SAE L4 and all SAE 5 automation that qualify for s2’s direct right. Indeed, the government’s actions could be equated to a shipping line that equips its vessels with life rafts that can only be deployed in fine weather.<br />
<br />
The public interest reasons for imposing strict liability under s2 AEVA for high and advanced levels of automation apply with equal force, if not even more so, to driver assist (SAE L2) and conditional automation (SAE L3), especially if there is reasonable cause to believe that the poorly understood human machine interaction involved at these levels make them comparatively less safe than the futuristic levels of near-autonomy promised by SAE L5 technology. Users and third-party victims are entitled to expect the same level of civil law protection from the risk of loss or injury from automated transport, whatever its type classification or sophistication. This is not provided under the existing common law and statutory framework for product defects in vehicles equipped with SAE L2 and 3, see below the response to Q18. This lacuna needs to be urgently addressed.<br />
<br />
<b>Driver assistance technology</b><br />
<br />
Whilst it is appreciated that comments are not necessarly invited on SAE L2 automation, the dividing line between driver assist and conditional automation, particularly when it comes to technical safety standards and what is meant by being ‘receptive to a handover requires or to an evident system failure’ means that the distinction is something of a grey area.<br />
<br />
If the safety of a vehicle equipped with SAE L3 conditional automation depends to any appreciable extent on a fallback driver being ready and able to promptly intervene in the dynamic driving task, independently of any ADS generated alert or call to action, then this could downgrade its classification to SAE L2.<br />
<br />
One major drawback with partial automation at SAE L2 concerns the speed and effectiveness of a driver’s intervention should it be needed and some of these vulnerabilities are alluded to at #3.7; #3.12; #3.85 and Appendix 3, 32. This exposes the wider road using public and the consumers to an appreciable risk of loss or injury.<br />
<br />
It stands to reason that even a conscientious and experienced supervising driver’s reaction will be delayed when compared to that of a normal driver. This is because a SAE L2 supervising driver is not reacting to the danger as it is first perceived but to a later event; which is inherently dangerous. It is reasonable to hypothecate the following sequence: first in time, there is the supervising driver’s realisation there is a danger or potential hazard ahead; next the gradual appreciation that the ADS has not responded appropriately (along a cognitive continuum ranging from the phenomenon emerging as a suspicion; to a its appreciation as a possibility; to a probability, then a near certainty) and during this process, the supervising driver reaching the conclusion that an intervention may be necessary. Further time may elapse if there is an emotional reaction, perhaps due to a momentary disbelief or hesitation where the ADS has previously operated faultlessly over a prolonged period. Accordingly, it would appear that the recommended thinking times and stopping distances within the Highway Code are no wholly appropriate for present levels of partial automation at SLA L2.<br />
There are a number of technical solutions that could at least partly mitigate the ‘full attention deficit’ / problem with driver distraction but it is unclear to what extent (if at all) these are adequately regulated, still less enforced, by the UK authorities.<br />
<br />
It should be a matter of real concern to any responsible government that thousands of vehicles equipped with SAE L2 automation are already in use on our roads and there appears to very little evidence of adequate regulation or independent testing. Nor does there appear to be any official consumer and user guidance on its safe use, nor any training or testing of driver / supervisor proficiency in the new skills needed to operate these systems safely.<br />
<br />
I am concerned that the regulation of existing driver assistance technology is inadequate. I offer one example. If one clicks through the link to ‘How Tesla’s autopilot system works’ in the BBC website referred to in the LCCR 240 at footnote 117 one comes to a video presentation by Mr Musk, the Tesla CEO. At 01.29 he explains that the vehicle’s ADS depends on its ‘long range ultrasonic sonar’ for its rear view. He does not give any indication of its actual range but the graphic suggests it is short. I am informed by those better qualified to comment that ultrasonic sensors are relatively crude sensors have a very short range and are mostly commonly used for parking. Even if we take Mr Musk at his word and accept, for the sake of argument, that he has adapted this to extend to 10 or 20 metres, this is clearly and obviously (i) far less that is required of a human driver and (ii) inadequate for dual carriageway or motorway traffic where there could be closing speeds of up to 40 mph that equates to 17.88 meters per second.<br />
<br />
I suggest that there should be a basic principle that no ADS should be permitted to rely on sensory input inferior to that required by law of a human driver in equivalent circumstances.<br />
I believe, notwithstanding the inherent vulnerabilities indicated above, that SLA L2 automation still has the potential to save many lives. One need only Google ‘Tesla Autopilot Prevents Crash Compilation’ to view a compelling if tendentious UTube video to see why this intermediate level of automation might prove attractive to night drivers, high-mileage drivers, commercial drivers and others. However, unless the Government takes urgent action to ensure that consumers and users are properly informed, trained and tested and that manufacturers equip the vehicles with fail-safe systems that ensure that supervising drivers are consistently and actively engaged in monitoring the dynamic driving task, that if any human intervention is depended upon for the vehicles’ safe operation, then that intervention will be causatively effective in preventing any danger, then they should be banned on the ground that without these fail-safe measures, the ADS is intrinsically unsafe. Manufacturers should be required to guarantee that an ODD cannot interfered with or altered by the user so as to present a danger or otherwise breach national road traffic laws.<br />
<br />
Q 7 (2) Consuming cold drinks or snacks, passive activities such as reading, listening, conversing, phone use should be permitted in vehicles with conditional automation but phone use should be remotely connected via an onboard phone consul and any reading managed by the car’s systems and positioned so as to minimise distraction from the view ahead). No typed emails or texts should be permitted, nor online shopping or form filling or other tasks that require concentrated undivided attention. In short most activity that can be stopped almost instantly and which leave the fallback user in the driving seat, correctly positioned and orientated, ready and able to respond to the call to action should be permitted.<br />
<br />
The urgent and immediate need to reform existing civil liability rules for transitional forms of automation.<br />
<br />
I refer to my response to Q18 on the urgent and compelling need to reform the civil liability and insurance provision for driver assist and conditional automation at SAE Ls 2 & 3. In my opinion, it might be easier for all concerned if the definition of ‘automated vehicle’ in s1 was amended to include all forms of ADS, including partial automation at SAE L2.<br />
<br />
In my view, the government appears to have missed a rare opportunity to persuade the motor insurance industry to accept a root and branch reform of the muddled and inconsistent statutory provision in this area (especially Part VI Road Traffic Act 1988) to bring its protection into line with the minimum standard of compensatory guarantee that applies on the continent. The opportunity arose from the high probability that the prospect of highly and fully automated vehicles (with its resulting public and product liability implications) amounted to an existential threat to motor insurers, whose business model is based on the personal fault-based liability of vehicle users. Yet the motor insurance industry has effectively secured a monopoly to underwrite the product liability risk of advanced futuristic vehicle automation. This advanced technology is likely to present a relatively low business risk for motor insurers: due in part to the insurer’s statutory right of recovery and partly to compelling commercial pressures on manufacturers to offer a Volvo style no-fault compensation guarantee in return for low premium rates. The government appears to have allowed the motor insurance industry to deftly evade the real and pressing need to provide mandatory cover for injury or loss caused by vehicle defects of existing and close to market technology that conceivably present an even greater risk to road safety than the more sophisticated levels of automation contemplated by the AEVA 2018.<br />
<br />
The government risks being accused of mapping out the legislative framework of the relatively safe high ground of highly advanced automation but failing completely in its responsibility to attend to the urgent task of mapping the treacherous path leading there.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-59931866812401430292019-02-03T17:21:00.003+00:002019-02-04T11:53:23.756+00:00Answers to LC Consultation Questions 2 - 5<h2 style="break-after: avoid; line-height: 25.92px; margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt -0.25pt; text-indent: -0.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles</span></i></b></h2>
<h2>
Consultation Question 2 (Paragraph 3.45) </h2>
<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on whether the label “user-in-charge” conveys its intended meaning. </span><br />
<br />
<h3>
<b>Answer: </b></h3>
Yes.<br />
<br />
<h2>
Consultation Question 3 (Paragraphs 3.47 - 3.57) </h2>
<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on whether it should be a criminal offence for a user-in-charge who is subjectively aware of a risk of serious injury to fail to take reasonable steps to avert that risk. </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;"><br /></span>
<b> Answer: </b><br />
Probably yes for SAE level 4 but not for SAE level 5 once ADS engaged for the reasons given at para 3.47 and para 3.54-56.<br />
I do not anticipate that any new criminal liability is called for in fully autonomous vehicles at SAE L5.<br />
Definition of risk needs to express an unacceptably high level; not any risk however small.<br />
<br />
<span style="color: blue;">When would a user-in-charge not be necessary? </span><br />
<h2>
Consultation Question 4 (Paragraphs 3.59 - 3.77) </h2>
<span style="color: blue;">We seek views on how automated driving systems can operate safely and effectively in the absence of a user-in-charge. </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;"><br /></span>
<br />
<h3>
<b>Answer: </b></h3>
See the answer to Q1 above.<br />
<br />
Type approval as fully automated (SAE L 5 automation) should be restricted to vehicles that have the capacity to operate in a completely driverless mode throughout its journey. I believe that this is likely to require its ADS to identify and respond appropriately to every sensory input that a human driver is required to identify and react to and to at least the standard of an experienced and competent driver (if not higher). This would include, distance of vision, hand signals and temporary road signs, weather conditions, unanticipated occurrences (#3.60) and nuanced scenarios where appropriate precautionary response / manoeuvre or to assume a minimal risk condition.<br />
<br />
Clearly this level of automation has yet to be achieved and I understand that it may not be so for at least ten years.<br />
<br />
Certain specified SAE L4 vehicles may have the capacity to operate safely without a user-in-charge where the automated DDT is confined to a low risk ODD where they can easily achieve a minimal risk condition without human intervention.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h2>
Consultation Question 5 (Paragraphs 3.59 - 3.77) </h2>
<span style="color: blue;">Do you agree that powers should be made available to approve automated vehicles as able to operate without a user-in-charge? </span><br />
<br />
<h3>
<b> Answer:</b> </h3>
Yes, see response to Q1 above. This qualified approval is subject to:<br />
<br />
(i) full automation (SAE L5), and<br />
(ii) Some highly automated vehicles (SAE L4) that have a highly prescriptive low risk ODD that cannot be overwritten in transit, where they can easily assume a minimal risk condition without human intervention and<br />
(ii) the unmanned being fully compliant with the relevant international regulations governing road traffic: e.g. the UNECE Vienna and Geneva Conventions (#2.51; #4.14) and the EU Framework Directive 2007/46/EC (#4.19) in each instance, as amended or replaced.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-77433264990695909102019-01-31T22:54:00.000+00:002019-02-04T11:53:49.460+00:00Answer to Consultation Q1<h2 style="break-after: avoid; line-height: 25.92px; margin: 0cm 0cm 6pt -0.25pt; text-indent: -0.5pt;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="color: #004d7e; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-font-family: Arial; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;">Law Commission Consultation on Automated Vehicles</span></i></b></h2>
<h2>
Consultation Question 1 (Paragraphs 3.24 - 3.43) </h2>
<div>
<span style="color: blue;"><a href="https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-vehicles/">https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-vehicles/</a></span></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<span style="color: blue;">Do you agree that: </span><br />
<span style="color: blue;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: blue;">(1)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>All vehicles which "drive themselves" within the meaning of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 should have a user-in-charge in a position to operate the controls, unless the vehicle is specifically authorised as able to function safely without one? </span><br />
<br />
<h3>
Short Answer: </h3>
1.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>No.<br />
<br />
2.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>I recommend a diametrically opposed approach for the high and advanced levels of automation anticipated by the AEVA 2018: The imposition of a user in charge should be the exception and not the rule.<br />
<br />
3.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>I suggest that the presence of a user-in-charge be largely confined to vehicles equipped with SAE L4 automation (where the ability to minimise any risk to safety can be addressed, progressively, as much through external factors, such as its operational design domain [ODD] as by product design. Indeed, at SAE L4 an automated vehicle’s ODD may often prove to be the decisive factor in determining it’s safety, particularly where has a relatively rudimentary level of ADS.<br />
<br />
4.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The role of a user-in-charge, as proposed, is largely antithetical to the concept of full automation at SAE L5. However, it is conceivable that a user-in-charge might be justified at SAE L5 in exceptional circumstances: as where, for example, dangerous substances are being transported by a fully automated vehicle. However, in such a scenario, the need for a user-in-charge would less attributable to the innate characteristics of the automated driving system (ADS), as opposed to its intended use.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
My answer then goes into considerable detail under two headings, the first considers fully automated vehicles subject to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) classification at Level 5, before considering the implications for vehicles equipped with SAE Level 5 high automation.</div>
<div>
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My basic premise is that we should ensure that safety is guaranteed through safe design, manufacturer and testing. We need to learn from history, e.g. the Red Flag Acts, and avoid imposing a human presence if it is not needed as this is likely to undermine the trans-formative potential of this new technology. That said the concept of imposing a user-in-charge may well have a role to play, as an exception to the rule.</div>
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<span style="color: blue;">Question 1 continued</span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">(2)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>The user-in-charge: </span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">(a)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>must be qualified and fit to drive; </span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">(b)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>would not be a driver for purposes of civil and criminal law while the automated driving system is engaged; but </span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">(c)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>would assume the responsibilities of a driver after confirming that they are taking over the controls, subject to the exception in (3) below? </span></div>
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<span style="color: blue;">(3)<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>If the user-in-charge takes control to mitigate a risk of accident caused by the automated driving system, the vehicle should still be considered to be driving itself if the user-in-charge fails to prevent the accident. </span></div>
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Answer: </h3>
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1.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Subject to the qualification given above, Yes to (2) and (3)</div>
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2.<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Additional and officially approved training and testing of the user-in-charge’s role and clarification of the standard of care to be expected of a user-in-charge is also essential.</div>
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I am happy to consider sharing my detailed arguments, if so requested.</div>
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<span style="color: red;">The consultation deadline expires on 8 February.</span></div>
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Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-36234958824812956592019-01-31T22:32:00.003+00:002019-01-31T22:32:52.194+00:00DEADLINE FOR LAW COM CONSULTATION IS 8 FEBRUARY 2019<h2>
The Law Commission's consultation on automated vehicles concludes on 8<span style="color: red;"> February 2019.</span></h2>
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It is vital that as many experienced personal injury practitioners as possible respond to this detailed consultation.</h3>
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Although the Commission's terms of reference are largely restricted to advising the government on the regulatory framework for the advanced forms of automated vehicles that are contemplated by the Automated & Electric Vehicles Act 2018, it is clear from the Commission's meticulous consultation paper, including some of the consultation questions (e.g. Questions 6, 7,8 and 12), that it realises that it needs to widen the remit of its research.<br />
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It is vitally important that informed professionals draw attention to the fact that the 2018 Act is a missed opportunity. By failing to address the present and immediate need to reform the liability and insurance framework that applies to semi-automated vehicles that are arriving on our roads in increasing numbers but which are not caught by the no-fault liability provisions of the 2018 Act, the government has effectively abandoned its responsibilities to accident victims who are ill served by the present inadequacies of the existing civil liability and insurance law framework for conventional vehicles.<br />
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I plan to post some of my draft responses to the Law Commission over the next week, to help others form their own view and to encourage others to take the time to respond.<br />
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The Law Commission's excellent paper can be accessed here: <a href="https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-vehicles/"><span style="color: blue;">https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-vehicles/</span></a><br />
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<br />Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2649783362311988948.post-31358398865027997332018-12-09T18:53:00.002+00:002018-12-09T18:54:46.314+00:00WHAT DOES BREXIT MEAN FOR PERSONAL INJURY?<h2>
New Webinar!</h2>
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On 25 February I will be co-presenting a webinar of the likely implications of Brexit for personal injury lawyers.<br />
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<a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1s2kxt7M_3P6da_UTV6j3QjpHH__x918I/view?usp=sharing" target="_blank"><span style="color: blue;">Follow the link</span> </a>for the programme and to book.Dr Nicholas Bevanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17651014251319501296noreply@blogger.com2