On the
scope and nature of the compulsory insurance requirement
The UK is still subject to the primacy of EU law, at least until March 2019. As the compensatory guarantee for victims of motor vehicle accidents in the UK is still governed by the superior and binding force of EC Directive (2009/103/EC) on motor insurance, it makes sense to begin any assessment of a claimant's legal entitlement to benefit from third party cover with an analysis of its provisions.
When
Article 3 of EC Directive (2009/103/EC) on motor insurance is read in the light
of the underlying principles that feature in the consistent line of Court of
Justice judgments from Bernaldez in
1996 through to Csonka in 2013, Vnuk in 2014 and Fidelidade in 2017 the third party cover required by the Directive
is capable of being distilled into the following simple propositions:
1. All motor insurance policies are required to provide a holistic guarantee for the assured's civil liability arising out of the insured vehicles' use. Article 3 requires each
member state to ensure that its national law requires such cover for:
a. Any
motor vehicle conforming with the wide definition in article 1 (mechanically propelled vehicle and intended for travel on land)
b. Any
use made of that vehicle that is consistent with the normal function of the vehicle
c. Anywhere
on land
d. That the third party victim's entitlement to the insurance guarantee extends to:
(i) liability for defects in the vehicle itself and
(ii) liability for
unauthorised users and
(iii) liability for other
non-contractual use
2. The user’s
duty to insure and the scope of cover that the insurer is required to provide are
coextensive.
3. Member
states have no discretion to introduce their own restrictions, exclusions or
limitations.
·
Only one exclusion of cover is permitted: this applies to a passenger
who voluntarily enters the vehicle knowing that it has been stolen (Article 13
of the Directive).
·
Subject to this
single derogation, once issued, the policy must confer on third party victims
an irrevocable guarantee of their compensatory entitlement, up to the minimum levels prescribed by Article 9, regardless of any
breaches of policy term or misinformation or fraud at the policy's inception
The
CJEU ruled in Candolin that any other
exclusion of insurer liability, whether contractual or statutory, is void. As CJEU rulings have direct effect, this
principle is capable of being applied as part and parcel of our national law
provision. The CJEU explained the
rationale thus:
‘18 In view of the aim of protecting victims, the
Court has held that Article 3(1) of the First Directive precludes an insurer
from relying on statutory provisions or contractual clauses in order to refuse
to compensate third-party victims of an accident caused by the insured vehicle
(Ruiz Bernáldez, paragraph 20)
…
‘20 By way
of derogation from that obligation, the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) [NCB note: this is now set out in Article 13
of the Directive] provides that certain persons may be excluded from
compensation by the insurer, having regard to the situation they have
themselves brought about (persons entering a vehicle which they know to have
been stolen) (Ruiz Bernáldez,
paragraph 21).
21
However, as it is a provision which establishes a derogation from a
general rule, the second subparagraph of Article 2(1) of the Second Directive
must be interpreted strictly.’
The
rationale in Candolin is just as capable of
being applied to the MIB scheme as it is to a contractual or statutory
provision regulating compulsory insurance.
It
is a surprising fact that it does not appear to have occurred to any claimant to invoke Candolin to challenge an unlawful
exclusion of liability, within a motor insurance policy, the Road Traffic Act
or one of the MIB Agreements. If all exclusions and restrictions in liability that are not expressly provided for within the Directive are void, then our national courts would appear to be bound by the horizontal effect of the Court of Justice's ruling in Candolin to excise the unlawful term when construing the policy terms. This issue has been referred to the Court of Justice by Ireland in David Smith v Patrick Meade & anor; FBD Insurance PLC (Case
C-122-17) for a preliminary ruling.
It
is clear from the CJEU judgments in Churchill
and Csonka that the Directive
requires the compensatory protection to be provided at an anterior stage,
namely within the insurance policy itself. It
follows that the Article 10 compensating body responsible for compensating
victims of uninsured and unidentified vehicles (which in the UK is the Motor
Insurers’ Bureau) is a’ last resort’; not a catch-all for insufficiently
insured vehicles.
I
am working a series of lectures on this important topic that will also explain
how best to deploy the three main EU law remedies that enable private
individuals to invoke, in a cost effective and proportionate manner, the
superior authority of EU law in ordinary civil actions against insurers, the
MIB and the Secretary of State for Transport.