Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG [2014] UKSC 22
The Supreme Court has
ruled that the widow of Major Cox, who was killed when he was knocked off his
bicycle in Germany, is not entitled to the more generous approach to quantifying
her loss under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
The driver responsible was insured with German based insurer, Ergo Versicherung AG. Mrs Cox brought a direct action in England against the foreign insurer, under articles 9 and 11 of the Brussels I Convention (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000) applying the FBTO Schadeverzekeringen NV -v- Jack Odenbreit, CJEU 2007 Case 0463/06see my earlier post Tale of Two Cases.
The driver responsible was insured with German based insurer, Ergo Versicherung AG. Mrs Cox brought a direct action in England against the foreign insurer, under articles 9 and 11 of the Brussels I Convention (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000) applying the FBTO Schadeverzekeringen NV -v- Jack Odenbreit, CJEU 2007 Case 0463/06see my earlier post Tale of Two Cases.
Liability was not disputed.
The accident
predated the application of Rome II (Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of 11
July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations). However it was common
ground that the effect of the Private
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 was that German law
applied to the claim. Mrs Cox contended
that the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 should still govern the way her damages should be assessed.
The applicable German law (governed by s 844 of the Bűrgerliches
Gezetzbuch) requires a victim’s right to maintenance be assessed on a full restitution
basis but it has strict rules against double recovery.
By comparison, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 creates a statutory exception
to our own common law rule against double recovery. This occurs in the way that a dependency claim
is treated as crystallising from the moment of death. Sections 3 & 4 expressly leave out of account the
re-marriage of the widow or her prospects of re-marriage as well as benefits that have or will or may accrue as a result of the death. This exception is a result of deliberate
Government intervention which was categorised by a majority of the Supreme Court
as a matter of substantive law.
The Supreme Court followed Harding
v Wealands [2006] 2 AC 1 which treats the heads of of damage as a matter of
substantive law to be determined by the foreign applicable law (in this case
Germany), whereas the approach to be adopted in their assessment is a question
of procedure that is governed by the law of the forum (in this case, England).
Since the Fatal Accident Act 1976 does not
have extra-territorial jurisdiction its special rules for quantifying a
dependency claim do not apply to Mr Cox's accident in Germany. Although English law applied to the
procedural aspects of quantifying Mrs Cox’s loss, the court would have to apply
the relevant German law governing the basic restitutionary principles. The result was that the normal common
law rule against double recovery applies to this claim, so that Mrs Cox was
entitled to her net loss only. This is consistent with the common law ‘not a penny less nor a penny more’
principle.
This ruling is also just as relevant to accidents on or after 11 January 2009, which are governed by Rome II. Under Rome II the
old distinction between substantive and procedural law no
longer applies. But see my earlier post CPR
rules apply to foreign accident claims which considers the implications
of Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers Assurances
[2014] EWCA Civ 138.
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