Three unanimous but erroneous Court of Appeal rulings.
- Delaney v Pickett [2011] EWCA Civ 1532
- EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] EWCA Civ 1267
- Sahin v Havard & Riverstone Insurance (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1202
·
In Delaney
v Pickett [2011] the court failed to question whether the insurers’ staple
defence of seeing a court declaration under s152(2) Road Traffic Act 1988 that
the policy is null and void due to a material non-disclosure or misrepresentation
could be invoked against a third party accident victim. It then proceeded to
compound its error by failing to disapply both s152 (2) and the
MIB’s exclusion of liability because it failed to attempt a European law
consistent construction of either the s152 or the Uninsured Drivers Agreement
by interpreting these provisions in the light of the European Motor Insurance
Directives they are supposed to implement.
My case commentary in the Journal of Personal Injury Law explained why the court had fallen into error on both counts. Since when, the Court of Justice’s ruling in Fidelidade Case C-287/16 in July 2017 has completely vindicated my contention that s152 (2) infringes Article 3 of this Directive and the Department for Transport has since been forced to remove the offending exclusion of MIB liability.
My case commentary in the Journal of Personal Injury Law explained why the court had fallen into error on both counts. Since when, the Court of Justice’s ruling in Fidelidade Case C-287/16 in July 2017 has completely vindicated my contention that s152 (2) infringes Article 3 of this Directive and the Department for Transport has since been forced to remove the offending exclusion of MIB liability.
· In both EUI Ltd v Bristol Alliance Ltd Partnership [2012] and Sahin v Havard & Riverstone Insurance [2016] I have
been openly critical of the way the court refused to engage properly with the
extensive line of European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings that preclude member
states from permitting any exclusions or restrictions of liability to be relied
on against a third party claimant (as opposed to the policyholder). In my JPIL article ‘Marking the Boundary’ I
explained in 2012 why EUI was made
per incuriam because it wrongly sought to restrict the general application of the
protective purpose principle, first propounded in Ruiz Bernaldez (Case C-129/94) in 1996, when it clearly has a wide
and general application as is evidence from the consistent line of subsequent
rulings culminating in Vnuk (Case
C-162/13) in 2014 and Fidelidade (Case C-287/16) in 2017.
In my New Law Journal article ‘Third Time Lucky’ in January 2017 I explain why the Court of Appeal erred in Sahin in following EUI. Unfortunately, both of these erroneous rulings continue to act as a deadweight for those seeking to uphold their proper entitlement under European law to a compensatory guarantee from a motor insurer: one that is free from any policy breaches or contractual restrictions that apply between the insurer and policyholder.
The profound incompatibility with European law remains. It has been raised as a ground within the ongoing judicial review by RoadPeace against the Secretary of State for Transport. More news about this soon, hopefully.
In my New Law Journal article ‘Third Time Lucky’ in January 2017 I explain why the Court of Appeal erred in Sahin in following EUI. Unfortunately, both of these erroneous rulings continue to act as a deadweight for those seeking to uphold their proper entitlement under European law to a compensatory guarantee from a motor insurer: one that is free from any policy breaches or contractual restrictions that apply between the insurer and policyholder.
The profound incompatibility with European law remains. It has been raised as a ground within the ongoing judicial review by RoadPeace against the Secretary of State for Transport. More news about this soon, hopefully.
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